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INTRODUCTION

Rule 801(d) of the Federal Rules of Evidence classifies two of the
most commonly used types of out-of-court statements—admissions of a
party and prior statements of a witness—as ―not hearsay.‖ It does so even
though these statements, when offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted, are hearsay under the definition of Rule 801(c).1 By labeling this
admittedly hearsay evidence as something that it is not, Rule 801(d) creates
an oxymoron.2
The term not hearsay (without quotation marks)3 has traditionally been
used to describe evidence that is genuinely not hearsay under the hearsay
definition. This traditional use of the term is both descriptively accurate and
analytically important. As every law student learns, the threshold issue in
hearsay analysis is whether the statement is hearsay, and any out-of-court
1. Rule 801(c) provides that an out-of-court statement is hearsay if it is ―offered to prove
the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.‖ FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
Rule 801(d) is titled ―Statements which are not hearsay” and provides:
A statement is not hearsay if—
(1) Prior statement by witness: The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to
cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent . . . or
(B) consistent . . . or (C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving him; or
(2) Admission by party-opponent: The statement is offered against a party and is [the
statement of the party or the party‘s representative].
The advisory committee‘s note to Rule 801 states that ―[s]everal types of statements which
would otherwise literally fall within the definition [of hearsay] are expressly excluded from it.‖
FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee‘s note.
2. GRAHAM C. LILLY, STEVEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, PRINCIPLES OF
EVIDENCE 160 n.1 (5th ed. 2009) (―This oxymoron is unlikely to make life easier for trial lawyers,
students and judges.‖).
3. This article will regularly refer to the two different uses of the term ―not hearsay.‖ To
distinguish between them, it will follow the example of 4 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C.
KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 35 (3rd ed. 2007) and will place ―not hearsay‖ in quotations
when referring to Rule 801(d) ―not hearsay‖ (where the statement is hearsay under Rule 801(c)
but is excluded from the hearsay rule by Rule 801(d)) and will not use quotations when referring
to the traditional meaning of not hearsay (where the statement is not hearsay under Rule 801(c)).
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statements are not hearsay, typically because they are not offered to prove
the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.4 The meaning of ―not
hearsay‖ in Rule 801(d) is inconsistent with this traditional meaning of not
hearsay.
Commentators have long criticized Rule 801(d)‘s ―not hearsay‖ term,
calling it ―awkward‖ (per Judge Henry Friendly in 1973),5 ―unnecessarily
confusing‖ (per Judge Edward Becker in 1992),6 ―wrong‖ (per Professor
Faust Rossi in 1993),‖7 and ―Orwellian‖8 (per Professor George Fisher in
2008). By taking a term with a well-known traditional meaning and giving
it a different meaning, the rule violates what has been called the ―Golden
Rule for Drafting‖9 – that the same term should be used consistently and
with the same meaning throughout a document.10 It also offends the
command of Rule 1.1 of the Guidelines for Drafting and Editing the Federal

4. The categories of these non-hearsay statements are well-known and include: 1)
statements that are offered to prove their effect on the listener; 2) words that have an independent
legal significance; 3) statements offered as circumstantial evidence of the declarant‘s state of
mind; and 4) prior statements offered to impeach or rehabilitate. See, e.g., 30B MICHAEL
GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 41-118 (Interim Edition 2006).
5. Rules of Evidence (Supplement): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of
the H. Comm. on the Jucidiary, 93rd Cong. 97 (1973) (correspondence of Henry J. Friendly,
Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit), reprinted in JAMES F. BAILEY, III & OSCAR
M TRELLES, II, THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES AND RELATED
DOCUMENTS.
6. See Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal
Rules of Evidence After Sixteen Years —The Effect of “Plain Meaning” Jurisprudence, The Need
For an Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of
the Rules, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857, 902 (1992); See also STEVEN A. SALTZBURG, MICHAEL
M. MARTIN & DANIEL J. CAPRA, 4 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL, 801-27 (9th ed.
2006) (―… Federal Rules regime is . . . confusing in the end because statements that clearly fit the
definition of hearsay are labeled, ipse dixit, ‗not hearsay.‘‖).
7. See Faust F. Rossi, Symposium — Twenty Years of Change, 20 LITIG. 1, Fall 1993, at
24. (―Treating party admissions as non-hearsay rather than as a traditional exception is wrong and
has been roundly condemned.‖); See also RICHARD O. LEMPERT, SAMUEL R. GROSS AND JAMES
S. LIEBMAN, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE: TEXT, PROBLEMS, TRANSCRIPTS, AND CASES
538, n.52 (4th ed., 2000) (stating the classification is a ―practical mistake‖).
8. GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 393 (2d ed. 2008) ( ―Orwellian labeling‖).
9. REED DICKERSON, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL DRAFTING 16 (2d ed. 1986)
(quoting E. PIESSE, THE ELEMENTS OF DRAFTING 43 (5th ed. 1976)) (―[T]he competent draftsman
makes sure that each recurring word or term has been used consistently. He carefully avoids using
the same word or term in more than one sense . . . In brief, he always expresses the same idea in
the same way and always expresses different ideas differently . . . Consistency of expression has
appropriately become the ―Golden Rule‖ of drafting.‖).
10. Technically, of course, the Federal Rules of Evidence contain only one meaning for
the term not hearsay, as Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 801(d) is the only place where the term
appears. However, the antonym of hearsay under the Rule 801(c) definition is not hearsay and
drafters and amenders should be aware of in their drafting a well-established, widely-known and
regularly-used antonymic use of a term, even if it does not appear in the text of the rule.
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Rules: ―Be Clear.‖11 As we near the end of a comprehensive project to
revise all federal court rules for clarity and consistency using the Guidelines
for Drafting and Editing the Federal Rules, it is anomalous to have a rule
that fails to meet the prevailing drafting standards and yet remains
untouched by the amending and restyling efforts.12
We can and should do better. This article presents several alternatives
to Rule 801(d) and endorses an amendment that would eliminate the
oxymoronic use by repealing Rule 801(d), classifying admissions and prior
statements as hearsay exceptions, and placing each in a new, separate,
appropriately labeled category.13 By repealing Rule 801(d) and its ―not

11. BRYAN A. GARNER, GUIDELINES FOR DRAFTING AND EDITING COURT RULES (5th ed.
2009). Rule 1.1 is titled ―Be Clear.‖
12. Working through its separate rules committees, the Judicial Conference‘s restyling
project is designed ―to simplify, clarify and make more uniform all of the federal rules of practice,
procedure and evidence.‖ COMMON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED STYLE REVISION OF THE
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 2 (2009) (released for public comment on Aug. 11, 2009). The
Rules of Appellate Procedure were amended with an effective date of December 1, 1998. FED. R.
APP. P. 1 advisory committee‘s note. The Rules of Criminal Procedure were amended with an
effective date of December 1, 2002. FED. R. CRIM. P. advisory committee‘s note. The Rules of
Civil Procedure were amended with an effective date of December 1, 2008. FED. R. CIV. P. 1
advisory committee‘s note. The restyling project for the Rules of Evidence began in 2007, draft
amendments were published for public comment in August 2009, and the Advisory Committee
approved those amendments in April 2010 and sent them to the Standing Committee.
Memorandum from Robert L. Hinkle, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules to the Hon. Lee
H. Rosenthal, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial
Conference
of
the
U.S.
1-6
(May
10,
2010),
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/EV05-2010.pdf.
13. As discussed in Section VI, I recommend what I call a ―four categories‖ approach,
with four separate categories for four types of hearsay exceptions based on the status of the
declarant. There would be a category for when 1) the declarant is a party (for admissions) (FED.
R. EVID. 801(d)(2)); 2) the declarant is a witness (for prior statements) (FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1));
3) the availability of the declarant is immaterial (FED. R. EVID. 803); and 4) the declarant must be
unavailable FED. R. EVID. 804(b)). There is of course a fifth category, the residual exception
currently represented by Rule 807. FED. R. EVID. 807. If the residual category represented by
Rule 807 were included in the count, the recommendation would be for a ―five categories‖
approach.
Several scholars have suggested modifications to Fed. R. Evid. Rule 801(d) over the years. In
1974, Professor Tribe made what I would call a ―four categories‖ recommendation, stating that
such a treatment would be ―more likely to keep attention riveted on the underlying reasons for
such exceptions and, thereby, on their appropriate limits.‖ Lawrence Tribe, Triangulating
Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957, 973 (1974); See also Paul R. Rice, The Evidence Project:
Proposed Revisions to the Federal Rules of Evidence with Supporting Commentary, 171 F.R.D.
330, 590 (1997) (suggesting a ―three categories‖ approach to hearsay); Paul R. Rice & Neals-Erik
William Delker, Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee: A Short History of Too Little
Consequence, 191 F.R.D. 678, 679 (2000) (stating that the Advisory Committee‘s policies
underlying its decision to revise particular rules is inconsistent with its practice and that the
piecemeal approach to revising the Rules perpetuates and compounds existing problems with the
Rules); Freda F. Bein, Parties’Admissions, Agents’ Admissions: Hearsay Wolves in Sheep’s
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hearsay‖ term, the proposed amendment would remove a source of
confusion and misunderstanding. By placing admissions and prior
statements in new, separate, clearly identified hearsay exceptions, the
amendment would also reinforce the distinctiveness of the two types of
statements and remind users of the separate rationales for their
admissibility.
The path to an amendment will not be easy. The Advisory Committee
considered the issue at its October 2010 meeting, during which it reviewed
an earlier version of this article and a thoughtful memorandum from
Reporter Dan Capra that highlighted issues and choices.14 At that meeting,
the Advisory Committee decided not to take any action on Rule 801(d).
While the members ―agreed in principle with [my] proposal,‖ they felt that
the rule ―was not a source of ambiguity or confusion and was being applied
properly in the courts. Moreover, the members felt that the time and
expense of making and incorporating a rule amendment outweighed the
need for changing the rule at [that] time.‖15
In light of the Advisory Committee‘s decision, I have two goals in
telling the story of how the ―ungainly category‖16 of Rule 801(d) came into
existence and proposing a better alternative. First, I hope to build support
for the consideration of an amendment at some future date. Exposing the
rule‘s flawed historical and intellectual foundation is a necessary part of
building that support. As one of the original rules of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, Rule 801(d) properly carries a strong presumption of legitimacy.
It was proposed by a distinguished Advisory Committee, was enacted by
Congress after a nearly two-year review, has been adopted by thirty-four
states, and has been the law for over thirty-five years. I attempt to rebut
that presumption by presenting the historical and intellectual background of
the rule and examining the reasons for its adoption. I conclude that there
were and are no good reasons for classifying admissions and prior
statements as ―not hearsay.‖ My second goal reflects the possibility that the

Clothing, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 393, 400 (1984) (stating that ―party admissions should be
reclassified as an exception to the hearsay rule‖ ); Roger C. Park, The Rationale of Personal
Admissions, 21 IND. L. REV. 509, 509 (1988) (―Because admissions are not required to be
trustworthy . . . they should not be considered an exception to the hearsay rule, but should be
placed in a special category of their own.‖).
14. The agenda of October 2010 meeting and Reporter Capra‘s September 16, 2010,
memorandum to the Advisory Committee are contained in the agenda materials at
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/ResearchingRules/AgendaBooks.
aspx.
15. Letter from Peter G. McCabe, Secretary to the Comm. on Rules and Practice of the
Judicial Conference of the United States to author (Nov. 1, 2010).
16. Park, supra note 13, at 509.
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Advisory Committee may never amend Rule 801(d).17 In that event, I hope
that the article‘s information and critical perspective will contribute to a
better understanding of the current flawed rule.
This article begins in Section II-A by discussing the treatment of
admissions and prior statements in the years leading up to the Federal
Rules. Two giants of evidence scholarship, John Henry Wigmore of
Northwestern and Edmund Morgan of Harvard, debated their classification
for much of the first half of the twentieth-century. After some initial
reservations,18 Wigmore decided that admissions and prior statements could
be offered as substantive evidence, but instead of classifying them as
hearsay exceptions, he placed them in a newly invented category that was
the intellectual forerunner of Rule 801(d) and that he called ―hearsay rule
satisfied.‖ Morgan, on the other hand, treated admissions and prior
statements as hearsay that should be admitted under a specific hearsay
exception.
Section II-B discusses the three predecessor evidence codes that were
adopted in each of the three decades prior to the Federal Rules of Evidence
and that strongly influenced the drafters of the federal rules—the A.L.I.
Model Code of Evidence in 1942, the first Uniform Rules of Evidence in
1954, and the California Rules of Evidence in 1964. Each of these codes
followed Morgan‘s lead and classified admissions and prior statements as
hearsay, admissible under a hearsay exception. If asked in 1965 to predict
how the forthcoming Federal Rules of Evidence would classify admissions
and prior statements, a thoughtful trial judge, trial lawyer, or evidence
professor would almost surely have said, ―As hearsay, and then admissible
under a hearsay exception.‖ But that prognostication would have been
wrong.
While the drafters of the Federal Rules relied on Morgan and the three
predecessor codes in many areas, they rejected this guidance as to the
classification of admissions and prior statements and instead largely
followed Wigmore‘s lead. Section III examines the drafting process that
led to Rule 801(d) and, in particular detail, the recommendations of the
Reporter for classifying admissions and prior statements as ―not hearsay.‖
For prior statements, the Reporter discussed whether such statements

17. Some commentators would argue that it is virtually inevitable that the Advisory
Committee will not amend Rule 801(d). See, e.g., Rice & Delker, supra note 13, at 679.
18. In the first edition of his treatise, Wigmore said that admissions and prior statements
were admissible only for impeachment purposes as ―self-contradiction‖ and thus were not hearsay
(his term was ―hearsay rule inapplicable‖). See 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE
SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW: INCLUDING THE STATUTES AND JUDICIAL
DECISIONS OF ALL JURISDICTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES (1st ed. 1904)
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should be admitted as substantive evidence or, as under the orthodox rule
that prevailed until the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, only for
impeachment.19 For admissions, which have long been received as evidence
and without the requirements (such as compliance with the personal
knowledge, competence, and opinion rules) imposed on other testimony, 20
the Reporter discussed why such statements are allowed without the
standard safeguards.21 Additionally, he explained why both admissions and
prior statements were different from the other hearsay exceptions and
therefore why it was important to treat them differently. Significantly, the
Reporter never adequately addressed what I call the how question—given
that admissions and prior statements are going to be admitted, and given
that they should be treated differently than the other hearsay exceptions,
how should they be classified. As we will see, the how question is the most
important one in analyzing the proper classification of and terminology for
admissions and prior statements.
Section IV examines the use and treatment of Rule 801(d) in case law,
evidence treatises, and law school casebooks. It shows that, while Rule
801(d) is awkward and confusing, it has not caused a crisis in the thirty-five
years that it has been the law. Indeed, it has not even created serious
practical problems on a day-to-day basis, for two main reasons. First, the

19. For impeachment, the prior statement is offered simply for the fact that it was made
and is inconsistent with the declarant‘s trial testimony, and not for its truth. Therefore, under the
standard definition, it is not hearsay. However, when offered as substantive evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted in the statement, the prior statement is hearsay. The orthodox rule
allowed the impeachment use but not the substantive hearsay use. Arguing that the purposes of
the hearsay rule had been met since the declarant was in court and subject to cross-examination
and observation, reformers long sought the admissibility of prior statements for their substantive
use. See Charles T. McCormick, The Turncoat Witness: Previous Statements as Substantive
Evidence, 25 TEX. L. REV. 573, 575 (1947); Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the
Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177, 218-19 (1948); FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(1) advisory committee‘s note.
20. The absence of these foundational requirements has led one commentator to call
admissions ―among the least trustworthy of all proof admissible at trial.‖ Bein, supra note 13, at
401. See also James L. Hetland, Jr., Admissions in the Uniform Rules: Are They Necessary?, 46
IOWA L. REV. 307, 315 (1961). While that remark overstates the point; in most instances the
statement is reliable, because in most cases it will be against interest and will be based on the
personal knowledge of a party who almost always will be in court; Park, supra note 13, at 516-17
– it does emphasize this first corollary for admissions: the lack of doctrinally-required
prerequisites of reliability.
21. Scholars have advanced a variety of reasons for receiving admissions as evidence,
including the adversary system of litigation, a sense of party responsibility for one‘s own words
and actions, estoppel, basic fairness, and emotion. After reviewing the literature and cases,
Professor Park concluded any single reason is reductionist and incomplete and that their favorable
treatment is best justified by a series of interlocking reasons. Park, supra note 13. See also Roger
C. Park, A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 51, 77-81 (1987).
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―not hearsay‖ terminology affects only the classification of the evidence,
not its admissibility.22 A particular prior statement or admission will be
admitted whether classified as ―not hearsay‖ under Rule 801(d) or, as
recommended later and as currently done in sixteen states, as a hearsay
exception. Second, lawyers and judges soon developed practical ways to
―work around‖ the confusing language, largely by ignoring Rule 801(d)‘s
―not hearsay‖ terminology and referring to admissions and prior statements
as hearsay exceptions, exclusions, or exemptions.23 These ―work-arounds‖
are no substitute for clear, consistent drafting in the first place, but they
have prevented the trial system from stumbling over Rule 801(d)‘s
confusing and inapt language.
Section V looks at Rule 801(d) and the second ―not hearsay‖ category
from the perspective of state evidence law and finds both conformity with
the federal law and creative non-conformity. Thirty-five of the forty-four
states that have adopted the federal rules have also accepted Rule 801(d)
and the ―not hearsay‖ category. These conforming jurisdictions have
simply ―followed the leader‖ on this issue with no record of considering
alternatives to Rule 801(d) or independently evaluating the wisdom of
introducing a second meaning of ―not hearsay‖ into their evidence lexicon.
Sixteen states have not adopted Rule 801(d), and several of these nonconforming states provide important examples of innovative alternative
approaches, fresh ideas from our ―laboratories of democracy.‖ 24
In Section VI, this article identifies and then evaluates six alternative
approaches to classifying admissions and prior statements. This evaluation
finds that Rule 801(d) is neither practically, doctrinally, nor theoretically
sound. It fails the tests of clarity and consistency required by the norms of
good drafting and remains a source of awkwardness and potential confusion
for busy practitioners and judges, not to mention law students learning the
law of hearsay for the first time. This article concludes by evaluating

22. ―There is no practical difference between an exception to the hearsay rule and an
exemption from that rule. If a statement fits either an exemption or an exception, it is not excluded
by the hearsay rule, and it can be considered as substantive evidence if it is not excluded by any
other Rule (e.g. Rule 403).‖ SALTZBURG, ET AL., supra note 6, at 801-27.
23. For example, if opposing counsel makes a hearsay objection to evidence of the out-ofcourt statement of a party, the proponent will more likely respond by saying, ―Yes, it is hearsay,
Your Honor, but it comes in under the admissions exception [or exclusion or exemption] under
Rule 801(d)(2)(A)‖ than by saying, ―Your Honor, it is not hearsay under Rule 801(d)(2)(A).‖
24. Cf. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). Nine states have adopted the Federal Rules but rejected the Rule 801(d) terminology.
See infra Section V. Seven other states — two (California and Kansas) that have their own
evidence codes and the five states that have not yet adopted the Federal Rules — treat these
statements as hearsay exceptions. See infra Section V.
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proposed amendments to Rule 801(d) in terms of the standards by which
the Advisory Committee decides whether to amend the evidence rules and
concludes that the benefits of such an amendment outweigh its modest
costs.
II. PRELUDE TO THE DRAFTING OF THE FEDERAL RULES
A. Wigmore, Morgan, and the Debate over the Classification of Admissions
and Prior Statements and the Organization of the Hearsay Exceptions
Dean John Henry Wigmore (1863-1943) and Professor Edmund
Morgan (1878-1966) were two giants of American evidence scholarship
during the first half of the twentieth century. Wigmore has been called the
―greatest legal writer in our history‖25 and his famous treatise, known
colloquially as Wigmore on Evidence, established the framework for the
discussion of most major evidence issues during the first six decades of the
twentieth century. 26
Upon its publication in 1904, Wigmore‘s treatise was acclaimed as
one of ―the most complete and exhaustive treatises on a . . . single branch of
our law that has ever been written,‖27 and the second and third editions were
similarly praised.28 But that first reviewer also noted that Wigmore‘s work
was in some respects ―new and strange . . . [and used] extravagantly novel
terms.‖29 After praising the second edition, another reviewer observed that:
[Wigmore] has an instinct for vocabulary, and an instinct for
classification; – but these instincts, unfortunately, are not always
under control. If the law calls a thing by one name, he is ever on
the alert for another; the inevitable result is a classification

25.
26.

McCormick, supra note 19, at 583.
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW: INCLUDING THE STATUTES AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS OF ALL JURISDICTIONS OF
THE UNITED STATES (1st ed. 1904)[hereinafter, Wigmore, (1st ed. 1904)].
27. Joseph H. Beale, Book Review¸18 HARV. L. REV. 478, 478-80 (1905) (reviewing
Wigmore, (1st ed. 1904)).
28. John M. Maguire, Book Review, 22 ILL. L. REV., 688, 692 (1928). Reviewing the third
edition, Morgan wrote, ―Not only is [it] the best, by far the best, treatise on the Law of Evidence,
it is also the best work ever produced on any comparable division of Anglo-American law.‖
Edmund M. Morgan, Book Review, 20 B.U. L. REV. 776, 793 (1940).
29. Beale, supra note 27, at 479-80. Professor Beale was relentlessly critical of
Wigmore‘s ―novel‖ nomenclature. ―In place of well-known terms, to which we are all
accustomed, Professor Wigmore presents us with such marvels as restrospectant evidence,
prophylactic rules, viatoriol privilege, integration of legal acts, autoptic proference, and other no
less striking inventions. It is safe to say that no one man, however great, could introduce into the
law three such extravagantly novel terms, and Professor Wigmore proposes a dozen.‖ Id.
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which, even after all these years, seems not only new but queer.30
As we will see, this observation about his ―vocabulary and instinct for
classification . . . not always [being] under control‖ applies all too well to
the Wigmore classification that was the intellectual forerunner of Rule
801(d), his ―hearsay rule satisfied‖ category.
Morgan‘s numerous articles and extensive professional service made
him ―one of the greats.‖31 Morgan and Wigmore both served on the two
major blue ribbon evidence committees of their time,32 as well as on the
first important attempt to draft a modern evidence code, the A.L.I. Model
Code of Evidence.33 Their competing views on the proper classification of
admissions helped to shape the drafting of both the three predecessor codes
and the Federal Rules of Evidence.
1. Wigmore and His Distinctive ―Hearsay Rule Satisfied‖ Category
In contrast to the traditional two step approach to hearsay analysis,
which asked two questions (is the evidence hearsay; if so, is there an
exception) and involved three categories (not hearsay, hearsay-not-withinan-exception, and hearsay-within-an-exception), Wigmore created a third
step and a fourth hearsay category, an approach which the Reporter adopted
for the Federal Rules of Evidence. He developed his distinctive approach in

30. Ralph Clifford, Book Review, 24 COL. L. REV. 440, 441 (1924). A more recent
reviewer wrote: ―I am newly aware that Wigmore in massive doses is frequently irritating, [and]
his personally coined language as often obscuring as illuminating.‖ Ronan E. Degnan, Book
Review, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1590, 1591 (1970).
31. Mason Ladd, Edmund M.Morgan, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1546 (1966). The American Bar
Association awarded Morgan a distinguished service medal in 1965, with a citation that read: ―. . .
your name, with that of Wigmore, is synonymous with the law of evidence.‖ Professor Edmund
M. Morgan Is Awarded the American Bar Association Medal, 51 A.B.A.J. 844 (1965).
32. These were the Commonwealth Fund Committee in the late 1920s, chaired by
Morgan, and the ABA Committee on Improvements in the Law of Evidence (the ―Wigmore
Committee‖) in 1938, chaired by Wigmore. American Bar Association Committee on
Improvements in the Law of Evidence, 63 ANN. A.B.A. REP. 1, 570 (1938).
33. Morgan served as Reporter and Wigmore as Chief Consultant, and there was tension
both in the selection of Morgan (as opposed to Wigmore) as Reporter and in their competing
views on many issues. Professor Twining suggests that the conflicts between Wigmore and
Morgan over the Model Code were similar to the clash between Williston and Llewellyon over the
Uniform Commercial Code a decade later:
In each case the leading scholar of an earlier generation resisted changes in form and
substance in his area of expertise and justified this opposition partly in terms of the
established ways of thought of the practicing profession. In each case the older
scholar was vulnerable to charges of having a vested interest in the status quo, as
both Wigmore and Williston were well aware.
WILLIAM TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE 163 (Stanford Univ.
Press 1985).
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1899, when he served as editor and revisor of the sixteenth edition of what
had long been the leading American treatise on evidence, Greenleaf on
Evidence.34 To the traditional two hearsay questions, Wigmore added a
third, writing in 1899 that:
[T]hree distinct groups of questions present themselves in
connection with the Hearsay rule, viz.: A. Is the Hearsay rule
applicable to the case at hand, i.e. is the evidence offered as a
testimonial assertion? B. Is there any exception to the Hearsay
rule to be made for the evidence offered? C. If the Hearsay rule
is applicable, and if no recognized exception covers the case in
hand, is the Hearsay rule satisfied, i.e. has there been, in fact, an
oath and cross-examination?35
These three questions (and the accompanying four categories) formed
the analytic structure of Wigmore‘s approach to the hearsay rule. While his
treatment of the first two questions was largely traditional, the third
question—and his creation of the fourth ―hearsay rule satisfied‖ category—
exemplified both his originality and his ―instinct for classification . . . [that
was] not always under control.‖36 The importance of the new question and
the new category has never before been clearly identified, probably because
his own treatise never articulated the third question or developed the fourth
category with the clarity and focus of the 1899 Greenleaf book.37
Nevertheless, they were central to his approach to hearsay and the hearsay
exceptions and were the intellectual forerunner of Rule 801(d).38
34. First published in 1842 by Professor Simon Greenleaf, Royall Professor of Law at
Harvard, the book was the leading evidence treatise of the nineteenth century. Wigmore‘s work
on the 16th edition was described as ― . . . more than a re-editing of the book, it is a remoulding of
it.‖ J.P.C., Jr., Book Review, 13 HARV. L. REV. 227, 228 (1899).
35. 1 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 185 (Boston, Little,
Brown, and Co., 16th ed. 1899).
36. Clifford, supra note 30, at 441.
37. Instead of the three questions and three-part classification of the Greenleaf book,
Wigmore wrote in his own treatise that: ―An exposition of the Hearsay rule embraces four general
topics: I. The Hearsay rule‘s requirements, and their satisfaction . . . II. The kinds of assertions
admitted as Exceptions to the Hearsay rule; III. Utterances, not being testimonial assertions, to
which the Hearsay rule is not Applicable; and IV. Sundry statements to which the Hearsay rule is
Applicable.‖ 1 Wigmore (1st ed. 1904), supra note 26, §1366, at 1696. However, these ―four
general topics‖ are discursive and descriptive, not analytical. They fit into the original three
categories as follows: 1) is the Hearsay rule applicable – included as parts of his topics I, III and
IV; 2) is there an exception—covered in topic II; and 3) is the Hearsay rule satisfied—discussed in
I. As we will see, while Wigmore placed admissions and prior statements in the ―hearsay rule
satisfied‖ category, he discussed them in the impeachment, not the hearsay, section of his treatise.
38. See, e.g., ROGER C. PARK, DAVID P. LEONARD & STEPHEN H. GOLDBERG, EVIDENCE
LAW: A STUDENT‘S GUIDE TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE AS APPLIED IN AMERICAN TRIALS 287-88
(2d ed. 2004) (posing what essentially are Wigmore‘s three questions in the context of analyzing
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a. The Hearsay Rule and the Hearsay Exceptions
While Wigmore never offered a precise definition of hearsay, his
description of the rule showed his approach: ―[T]he Hearsay rule, as
accepted in our jurisprudence, signifies a rule rejecting assertions, offered
testimonially, which have not been in some way subjected to the test of
Cross-examination[.]‖39 For Wigmore, ―[t]he theory of the Hearsay rule is
that the many possible sources of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness which
may lie underneath the bare untested assertion of a witness can best be
brought to light and exposed . . . by the test of cross-examination.‖40
However, the hearsay rule did not exclude all untested assertions.
Noting that ―[t]he purpose and reason of the Hearsay rule [to test assertions
through cross-examination] is the key to the exceptions to it[,]‖41 Wigmore
then recognized that ―[the] test . . . may in a given instance be superfluous .
. . [where] the statement offered is free from the risk of inaccuracy and
untrustworthiness, so that the test of cross-examination would be a work of
supererogation.‖42
Furthermore, ―the test may be impossible of
employment [for example, if the declarant dies], so that, if his testimony is
to be used at all, there is a necessity for taking it in the untested shape.‖43
Wigmore generalized from these observations to find that two
principles, Necessity and Trustworthiness, were ―responsible for most of
the Hearsay exceptions.‖44 While they are ―only imperfectly carried out . . .
they play a fundamental part. It is impossible without them to understand
the exceptions. In these principles is contained whatever of reason
underlies the exceptions. What does not present itself as an application of
them is the result of mere precedent, or tradition, or arbitrariness.‖45 In

the federal rules).
39. 2 WIGMORE (1st ed. 1904), supra note 26 §1362, at 1675. Twenty pages later, he
penned his famous praise of cross-examination as ―beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine
ever invented for the discovery of truth.‖ Id. at §1367, p. 1697.
40. Id. § 1420, at 1791 (citation omitted). Testimonial assertions also had to satisfy a
second test, which he called Confrontation. While this article will not discuss his views on nonconstitutional and constitutional confrontation, it must be noted that they are idiosyncratic, dated,
and conflated by the Confrontation Clause and hearsay exceptions. Id. § 1397, at 1757.
41. Id. § 1420, at 1791.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. § 1420, at 1792. Wigmore stated that ―Mr. Starkie, in 1824, was the first writer to
state plainly the philosophy of the Exceptions.‖ Id. § 1422, at 1793 n.2 (citation omitted).
45. Id. § 1423, at 1794. Wigmore‘s view of Necessity was broader and more flexible than
the current understanding of unavailability as expressed in Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule
804(a). This covered not only situations where the declarant was ―dead, or out of the jurisdiction,
or insane, or otherwise unavailable for the purpose of testing,‖ what he called ―the commoner and
more palpable reason,‖ but also situations where ―[t]he assertion may be such that we cannot
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applying these principles in all three editions of his treatise, Wigmore listed
the exceptions in the following order, starting with the most unavailable:
1. Dying Declarations; 2. Statements against Interest; 3.
Declarations about family history; 4. Attestation of a Subscribing
Witness; 5. Regular Entries in the Course of Business; 6. Sundry
Statements of Deceased Persons; 7. Reputation; 8. Official
Statements; 9. Learned Treatises; 10. Sundry Commercial
Documents; 11. Affidavits; 12. Statements by a Voter; 13.
Declarations of Mental Condition; 14. Spontaneous
Exclamations.46
Besides showing that there were far fewer hearsay exceptions in
Wigmore‘s time, his list reveals two other interesting points. First, there
was the crude beginning of the modern division of the hearsay exceptions
into two categories, one based on necessity (the Rule 804 category) and the
other based on reliability (the Rule 803 category). Second, former
testimony, admissions, and prior statements are missing from his list of
hearsay exceptions. As discussed in the next sub-section, Wigmore placed
these statements in the ―hearsay rule satisfied‖ category, not with the
hearsay exceptions.
Morgan was critical both of Wigmore‘s view that ―the hearsay rule
and its exceptions in outline, though not in detail, form a logically coherent
whole‖47 and of Wigmore‘s claim that the two principles in fact explained

expect, again or at this time, to get evidence of the same value from the same or other sources . . .
[as] in the exception for Spontaneous Declarations, for Reputation, and in part elsewhere.‖
Compare 2 WIGMORE (1st ed. 1904), supra note 26 §142, at 1793, with FED. R. EVID. 804(a).
46. 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW: INCLUDING THE STATUTES AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS OF
ALL JURISDICTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA § 1426, at 159 (2d ed. 1923)
[hereinafter WIGMORE (2d ed. 1923)]. In the first edition, Wigmore ended his introduction to the
hearsay exceptions with the above listing of the fourteen exceptions. In the second and third
editions, Wigmore included another section titled ―The Future of the Exceptions.‖ He began the
new section by writing that ―[t]he needless obstruction to investigation of truth caused by the
Hearsay rule is due mainly to the inflexibility of its exceptions and to the rigidly technical
construction of those exceptions by the Courts.‖ Id. at 1427. He urged the adoption of a general
exception for all statements of deceased persons and, in the third edition, also supported the
formation of a committee to codify the exceptions to the hearsay rule. 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE,
A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW: INCLUDING THE
STATUTES AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS OF ALL JURISDICTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND
CANADA § 1427, at 209 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter WIGMORE (3d ed. 1940)]. The third edition also
supported a liberalization of the hearsay rule to grant the trial judge flexibility and discretion in
applying the hearsay rule in individual cases. Id. at 215. Then-Professor Jack Weinstein
elaborated and extended Wigmore‘s suggestion in his famous article, Probative Force of Hearsay.
Jack B. Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REV. 331 (1961).
47. Edmund M. Morgan & John MacArthur Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at
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the many different and varied hearsay exceptions. Morgan had a very
different perspective. Far from a ―logically coherent whole,‖ in his view,
―the hearsay rule with its exceptions . . . resemble[s] an old-fashioned crazy
quilt made of patches cut from a group of paintings by cubists, futurists and
surrealists . . . . ―48 Writing at a time when the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure were in the process of being adopted and hoping for a similar
modernization of the evidence rules, Morgan believed that the solution lay
not in judicial refinement or further scholarly classifications but rather in a
codification governed by ―practical considerations.‖49 While Wigmore
also favored legislation,50 Morgan thought that Wigmore‘s stated belief in
the overall rationality of the common law of evidence undermined the
support for the urgency of the needed codification.
b. The ―Hearsay Rule Satisfied‖ Category
Wigmore invented the ―hearsay rule satisfied‖ category, the
forerunner of Rule 801(d)‘s ―not hearsay‖ category, as he was preparing the
sixteenth edition of Greenleaf on Evidence. Wigmore was considering
how to classify evidence of two types of out-of-court statements: the former
testimony of an unavailable witness and a deposition of either an available
or unavailable witness.51 The common law and previous treatise writers
had long treated both former testimony and depositions as hearsay and
admitted them as hearsay exceptions, but Wigmore was not satisfied with
Evidence, 50 HARV. L. REV. 909, 920 (1937). Professor Morgan co-authored this article with his
long-time Harvard colleague, John Maguire, who described their working relationship as ―a kind
of unarticled partnership in legal education with Morgan as senior and Maguire as junior.‖ John
MacArthur Maguire, Edmund M. Morgan as a Colleague, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1541 (1965).
48. Morgan & Maguire, supra note 47, at 921. He and his colleague Professor Maguire
further explained:
There is in truth no one theory which will account for the decisions. Sometimes an
historical accident is the explanation; in some instances sheer need for the evidence
overrides the court‘s distrust for the jury; in others only the adversary notion of
litigation can account for the reception; and in still others either the absence of a
motive to falsify, or a positive urge to tell the truth as the declarant believes it to be,
can be found to justify admissibility. Within a single exception are found
refinements and qualifications inconsistent with the reason upon which the
exception itself is built. Id.
49. Id. Morgan was a member of the Advisory Committee on Civil Procedure.
50. See American Bar Association, supra note 32; 3 Wigmore (3d ed. 1940), supra note
46, § 1427.
51. In the paradigm case of former testimony, witness W has testified under oath and has
been cross-examined in Trial 1. After the case is reversed on appeal and remanded for a new trial,
Trial 2, the witness W becomes unavailable and the proponent offers the transcript of the former
testimony from Trial 1. In a deposition, the witness testifies under oath and subject to crossexamination at the out-of-court deposition, and then is either available or unavailable at trial.

Stonefield 6-13-11 (Do Not Delete)

2011]

6/13/2011 9:38 AM

Rule 801(d)’s Oxymoronic “Not Hearsay” Classification

15

this traditional treatment. Examining the issue ―more in detail,‖52 he found
a 1892 Minnesota case with dicta stating that: ―[Former] testimony . . . is
frequently inaccurately spoken of as an exception to the [Hearsay] rule . . . .
The chief objections to hearsay evidence are the want of the sanction of an
oath, and of any opportunity to cross-examine, neither of which applies to
testimony given on a former trial.‖53
Using the Minnesota case as his authority, he created the new third
category and presented it in a newly titled chapter ―Hearsay Rule Satisfied;
Testimony by Deposition and Testimony at a Former Trial.‖ With
depositions and former testimony, the declarant was under oath and subject
to cross-examination (or at least the opportunity for cross-examination) at
the time of making the out-of-court statement. Because a major purpose of
the hearsay rule had already been accomplished, Wigmore decided to
change the classification of former testimony and depositions from their
traditional category as hearsay exceptions to ―hearsay rule satisfied.‖
All three editions of Wigmore‘s treatise had a section entitled
―Hearsay Rule Satisfied,‖ containing several sub-sections and hundreds of
pages of general discussion, with many examples of the importance of
cross-examination and the value of confrontation. But the actual subsection applying the category was, in each edition, less than one page and
was entitled ―Cross-examined Statements not an Exception to the Hearsay
Rule.‖54 Pointing out that, in the case of former testimony and depositions,
there has been prior cross-examination, Wigmore wrote that the evidence
―has satisfied the rule and needs no exception in its favor. This is worth
clear appreciation, because it involves the whole theory of the rule.‖55
The ―hearsay rule satisfied‖ category is characteristic of Wigmore‘s
―instinct for classification.‖ It highlighted an important feature of former
testimony and depositions—oath and cross-examination at the time of the
making of the out-of-court statement—and therefore was analytically
52. 1 GREENLEAF, supra note 35, §§ 163-163a, at 277.
53. Minneapolis Mill Co. v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry., 53 N.W. 639, 642 (Minn. 1892).
The quoted language is dicta because the hearsay issue in the case was the scope of unavailability
under the former testimony exception and whether the declarant had to be dead or could be
unavailable in some other manner. The court required only that the declarant be unavailable. Id.
54. See generally JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW: INCLUDING THE STATUTES AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS OF ALL
JURISDICTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES (1st ed. 1904); JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON
ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW: INCLUDING THE
STATUTES AND DECISIONS OF ALL JURISDICTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA (2nd ed.
1923); JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW: INCLUDING STATUTES AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS OF ALL
JURISDICTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA (3rd ed. 1940).
55. Id. at 1710.
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interesting. However, it was also problematic in one minor and one more
serious way.56 As a minor point, it is descriptively inaccurate. Since the
fact-finder in the current trial still does not have the opportunity to view the
declarant‘s demeanor, not all of the concerns of the hearsay rule have been
satisfied. For this reason, one of Wigmore‘s disciples, Professor Strahorn,
renamed the category as ―hearsay rule partially satisfied.‖57 More
importantly, the new category abandoned a well-accepted approach
(treating these statements as hearsay exceptions) and introduced a new
approach—with a new legal category and legal term—without assessing
their costs and benefits or evaluating alternatives. Such unexamined
innovation is not a virtue even in an author‘s individual treatise. It becomes
a serious vice when followed in an evidence code, especially if the new
term conflicts with a well-established one.
2. Wigmore and Morgan On Admissions
Wigmore and Morgan had competing positions on the classification of
admissions. While Wigmore changed his initial views as a result of
Morgan‘s 1921 article, his changed position was still different than
Morgan‘s, just in a narrower way. In the 1899 edition of Greenleaf‘s
Treatise, Wigmore treated admissions as an example of self-contradicting
impeachment evidence, not as substantive evidence.58 Since he thought that
admissions were used only to contradict and to impeach, they were not
testimonial, and the hearsay rule was ―inapplicable‖ (i.e., they were not
hearsay).59
In the first edition of his own treatise in 1904, Wigmore continued to

56. As an observation and not a criticism, it should also be noted that this category is
Wigmore‘s invention, with very modest case support. In addition to the dictum from the
Minnesota case previously described in footnote 53, Wigmore used a quotation from an early
opinion in the famous Wright v. Tatum case. The opinion from which Wigmore quoted was from
the first round of appeals and concerned the former testimony of a deceased attesting witness to
the will (and not from Baron Parke‘s opinion in a later appeal that addressed the admissibility of
letters for their ―implied assertions‖ and used the ship captain‘s hypothetical. Wright v. Doe,
(1837) 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (K.B.)). Wigmore quoted Chief Judge Tindall for the point that ―the
evidence resulting from the written examination of the deceased witness, in the former suit
between the same parties, is of as high a nature, and as direct and immediate, as the viva voce
examination of one of the witnesses remaining alive and actually examined in the cause.‖ Wright
v. Tatham, (1834) 110 Eng. Rep. 1108, 1116. This statement established that such former
testimony should be received as evidence but had absolutely no bearing on whether it should be
admitted as a hearsay exception or under the ―hearsay rule satisfied‖ category.
57. John S. Strahorn, Jr., A Reconsideration of the Hearsay Rule and Admissions, 85 U.
PA. L. REV. 484, 501 (1937).
58. GREENLEAF, supra note 35, at 292.
59. Id.
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regard admissions as admissible only as impeachment evidence, viewing
them as another form of self-contradiction, ―when it appears that on some
other occasion he has made a statement inconsistent with his present
claim.‖60 He located his discussion of admissions in the treatise section on
Testimonial Impeachment, immediately following the chapter on Prior
Statements, not in his 673 page treatment of the hearsay rule. He wrote
that:
The use of admissions is on principle not obnoxious to the
Hearsay rule; because that rule affects such statements only as
are offered for their independent assertive value after the manner
of ordinary testimony, while admissions are receivable primarily
because of their inconsistency with the party‘s present claim and
irrespective of their credit as assertions; the offeror of the
admissions, in other words, does not necessarily predicate their
truth, but uses them merely to overthrow a contrary position now
asserted. Just as the Hearsay rule is not applicable to the use of a
witness‘ prior self-contradictions, so it is not applicable to the
use of an opponent‘s admissions.61
While Wigmore recognized that admissions might also have ―an
additional and testimonial value, independent of the contradiction and
similar to that which justifies the Hearsay exception for declarations against
interest,‖62 he believed that this second, substantive use was permitted only
if the statement satisfied the requirements of the declaration against interest
exception.63 For Wigmore in 1904, there was no permissible substantive
use for admissions qua admissions.
In 1921, Morgan wrote an influential law review article, Admissions
as an Exception to the Hearsay Rule,64 that attacked Wigmore‘s view that
admissions were not hearsay. Morgan reviewed the history of admissions
and demonstrated that Wigmore‘s position was unsound in theory and
unsupported by case law. Summarizing his argument, he wrote:
Certain it is that extra-judicial admissions are received in
evidence. Equally certain is it that they are received for proving

60. 2 WIGMORE (1st ed. 1904), supra note 26, §1048, at 1217.
61. Id. at 1218-19 (citations omitted).
62. Id. at 1218 (citations omitted).
63. See Id. (suggesting the statement would have to be against interest at the time it was
made, and the declarant would have to be unavailable.).
64. Edmund M. Morgan, Admissions as an Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 30 YALE L.J.
355 (1921).
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the truth of the matter admitted. It is likewise certain that they
do not fall within that exception to the rule against hearsay [sic]
which admits declarations against interest. These are the facts,
and from them the conclusion is inevitable that they are received
as an exception to the rule against hearsay, and not that they are
received on any theory that they are not hearsay.65
Morgan ended his article by posing and then providing an affirmative
answer to his question: Is there a justification in principle for such an
exception? He noted that, in creating hearsay exceptions, courts ―have
appeared to require only some guaranty of truth . . . and some measure of
necessity.‖66 And he posited that the reason for these requirements was
―chiefly the protection of the party against whom the evidence is to be used,
rather than . . . eliminat[ing] the possibility of false testimony.‖67 He
supported this view by noting that courts regularly receive hearsay (as well
as other) evidence if the opponent does not object to it.68
Morgan then stated, as ―too obvious for comment,‖ that in the case of
an admission, ―the party whose declarations are offered against him is in no
position to object on the score of lack of confrontation or lack of
opportunity for cross-examination‖ and that ―[a]ll the substantial reasons
for excluding hearsay are therefore wanting.‖69 He concluded by asserting
that the party against whom the admission is offered ―cannot object to it
being received as prima facie truthworthy, particularly when he is given
every opportunity to qualify and explain it.‖70
In the second edition of his treatise, published in 1923, Wigmore
stated that Morgan‘s ―acute criticism‖ had led him to revise his views on
admissions and to recognize that admissions can be admitted for two
purposes: for impeachment, as self-contradiction, and substantively, to

65. Id. at 359-60. (Notice that in the last sentence of the quotation, Morgan uses the
phrase not hearsay. He is referring to Wigmore‘s original position that admissions were not
offered for their substantive use, but only as self-contradiction. Thus, since they were not used for
the truth of the matter asserted, admissions–in Wigmore‘s original view–were not hearsay in the
traditional sense.).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. n.13.
69. Id. at 361.
70. Id. (In a footnote, Morgan also mentioned a quasi-estoppel argument made in a 1911
treatise: ―‗The competency of an admission is not so much an exception to the rule excluding
hearsay as based upon a quasi-estoppel which controls the right of a party to disclaim
responsibility for any of his statements.‘‖ 2 CHARLES FREDERIC CHAMBERLAYNE, A TREATISE
ON THE MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE § 1292, at 1636 (1911).‖ Morgan then stated: ―The so
called ‗quasi-estoppel‘ may furnish one of the reasons for making an exception to the hearsay rule,
but it cannot prevent its being an exception.‖).
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prove the truth of the matter asserted.71 He wrote that, as substantive
evidence, they are hearsay but ―pass the gauntlet [of the hearsay rule] when
offered against him as opponent, because he himself is in that case the only
one to invoke the Hearsay rule and because he does not need to crossexamine himself.‖72 Elaborating further, Wigmore wrote:
The theory of the Hearsay rule is that an extrajudicial assertion is
excluded unless there has been sufficient opportunity to test the
assertion by the cross-examination by the party against whom it
is offered; e.g. if Jones had said out of court, ―The partyopponent Smith borrowed this fifty dollars,‖ Smith is entitled to
an opportunity to cross-examine Jones upon that assertion. But
if it is Smith himself who said out of court, ―I borrowed this fifty
dollars,‖ certainly Smith cannot complain of lack of opportunity
to cross-examine himself before his assertion is admitted against
him. Such a request would be absurd. Hence the objection of
the Hearsay rule falls away, because the very basis of the rule is
lacking, viz. the need and prudence of affording an opportunity
of cross-examination. In other words, the Hearsay rule is
satisfied; Smith has already had an opportunity to cross-examine
himself; or (to put it another way) he now as opponent has the
full opportunity to put himself on the stand and explain his
former assertion.73
While Wigmore accepted the substantive use of admissions, he
rejected Morgan‘s view that admissions should be treated as an exception to
the hearsay rule. However, he never fully elaborated the reasons for his
rejection. His only discussion of the classification issue was in a single
footnote, which reads in its entirety:
In the following article is found an acute criticism of the theory
of Admissions as originally here expounded, and in the light of
that article the above text has been revised: Professor Edmund
M. Morgan, ―Admissions as an Exception to the Hearsay Rule‖,
Yale L. Journal, 1921, XXX, 355. It is believed that the
reasoning now set forth in §§1048, 1049, places the theory of
Admissions on the sounder basis.74

71.
72.
73.
74.

2 WIGMORE (2d ed. 1923), supra note 46, §1048, at 504, n.1.
Id. at 505.
Id (citations omitted).
Id. at 504 n.1. The third edition of the Treatise was unmodified on this point.
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There are several interesting yet disappointing aspects to Wigmore‘s
treatment of admissions in the 1923 treatise (which continued unchanged in
the 1940 edition). First, although he used the phrase ―the hearsay rule is
satisfied‖ in his discussion, he kept his treatment of admissions in the
Testimonial Impeachment section of the treatise, where he had discussed
admissions (as not hearsay) in the first edition, not in the ―hearsay rule
satisfied‖ chapter, §1370. Furthermore, section1370 of the treatise
remained unchanged and still discussed only former testimony and
depositions–and did not mention admissions.
Second, Wigmore did not make any attempt to compare admissions to
former testimony and depositions—the two types of evidence for which he
had originally created the ―hearsay rule satisfied‖ category. Had he done
so, he would have noted that in the case of former testimony and
depositions, evidence law imposes a requirement of cross-examination
when making the out-of-court statement, whereas there is no such crossexamination requirement for admissions. For former testimony and
depositions, there is actual cross-examination (or, at the least, an actual
opportunity to cross-examine); with admissions, there is only the fact that
the party ―cannot complain of lack of opportunity to cross-examine‖75 and
will ordinarily have the opportunity to take the stand and explain the prior
statement. Accordingly, the way in which admissions might or should
satisfy the hearsay rule would be quite different from the way that former
testimony and depositions unquestionably do satisfy the cross-examination
aspects of the rule. Whereas, the actual cross-examination in the case of
former testimony goes to traditional hearsay concerns like reliability, the
favorable treatment of admissions stems instead from notions of party
responsibility for their own statements and the adversary theory of trials.
One can reasonably expect a treatise writer to acknowledge and discuss
such differences.
Third, although aware of Morgan‘s article advocating the treatment of
admissions as a hearsay exception, Wigmore did not discuss the
comparative advantages and disadvantages of placing admissions into the
―hearsay rule satisfied‖ section as opposed to the ―hearsay exception‖
category. Instead, he simply placed it in that category and announced that it
was ―on [a] sounder basis.‖76 Finally, and related to the third aspect, he did
not cite any case law or scholarly writing in support of his decision. In the
grand manner of the respected oracle that he was, he simply announced the

75.
76.

Id. at 505.
Id. at 504 n.1.
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classification on his own authority.77
Morgan continued to advance his argument that admissions should be
treated as hearsay exceptions and to attack Wigmore‘s placement of
admissions into the ―hearsay rule satisfied‖ category. He also argued that
Wigmore classified admissions and former testimony as he did for an
ulterior motive: to support his broader project of rationalizing the hearsay
exceptions. Morgan wrote:
So long as Mr. Wigmore agrees with the courts and other
commentators that admissions, confessions and former
testimony, when received in evidence, are properly used as
tending to prove the truth of the matter asserted in them, why
argue about classification? Only for this reason,—by excluding
these from the hearsay class, Mr. Wigmore is able to give to this
whole subject an apparent coherence and rationality which it
totally lacks. By this device of classification he purports to show
that in each recognized exception to the hearsay rule some
necessity for using the hearsay evidence in place of the
declarant‘s testimony is present, and some guaranty of
trustworthiness is to be found which distinguishes the admissible
utterance from hearsay in general and serves, however feebly, as
a substitute for cross-examination. This enables him to
champion the rules and direct his fulminations against the foolish
refinements in their application. It permits him to slur the fact
that the law governing hearsay today is a conglomeration of
inconsistencies developed as a result of conflicting theories.78
Morgan thus suspected that Wigmore placed admissions (and former
testimony) in the ―hearsay rule satisfied‖ category not primarily for the

77. In his book on Bentham and Wigmore, William Twining observed that ―one of the
difficulties of debating with Wigmore was that, so great was his influence, once he had
perpetrated a doctrine on the basis of little or no authority, precedents would soon follow to fill the
gap. Great treatise writers are among those who can pull themselves up by their own bootstraps.‖
TWINING, supra note 33, at 111.
78. Edmund M. Morgan, Book Reviews, 20 B.U. L. REV. 776, 790-91(1940) [hereinafter
Morgan, Book Review]; see also Edmund M. Morgan, The Future of the Law of Evidence, 29 TEX.
L. REV. 587, 593-94 (1951) (By classifying admissions, confessions, and admissible reported
testimony as nonhearsay, he made the other exceptions appear to have a consistency and
rationality which I believe non-existent. In each exception he found a necessity for the use of
secondary evidence and a guaranty of trustworthiness in the admitted hearsay which is lacking in
ordinary hearsay. In so doing he furnished ammunition for that large segment of the profession
which asserts, and sometimes seems to believe, that the accepted rules represent the ‗crystallized
wisdom of the ages,‘ and which, therefore, opposes changes that Wigmore would ardently
champion.‖).
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affirmative reason that they belonged there but for the negative reason that
he wanted to exclude them from the roster of hearsay exceptions, in order to
maintain the rationality—and to Morgan, the false rationality79—of his
organizational plan for the hearsay exceptions.
As we will see,
rationalizing the hearsay exceptions was precisely the reason that the
Reporter gave for placing admissions in the Rule 801(d) ―not hearsay‖
category.
The debate between Wigmore and Morgan was never fully joined,
primarily because Wigmore never again addressed the classification issue
after announcing his amended position in the 1923 edition of his treatise.
Reviewing the third edition in 1940, Morgan mildly criticized Wigmore for
not engaging this and other issues,80 but with no response. Wigmore died in
1943.
3. Wigmore and Morgan on Prior Statements
The extensive pre-Federal Rules scholarship and case law on prior
statements focused almost exclusively on the issue of admissibility—
whether prior statements should be admitted as substantive evidence or
used only for impeachment—and not on their classification. The orthodox
rule permitting prior statements to be used only for impeachment was the
prevailing law up to the time of the enactment of the federal rules in 1975,
and the writers and judges discussed whether, and to what extent, to
overturn the orthodox rule. There was very little writing—by Wigmore,
Morgan, or anyone else—on the how issue and classification.
Under the orthodox rule, the classification of prior statements was
easy. Prior statements offered only to impeach were not hearsay, because
they were not offered for their truth. Prior statements offered substantively,
to prove their truth, were hearsay and were excluded by the hearsay rule.
To admit them substantively, most writers advocated creating a hearsay

79. Edmund M. Morgan, Some Suggestions for Defining and Classifying Hearsay, 86 U.
PA. L. REV. 258, 273 (1938) (―It, therefore, seems not only futile but positively harmful to make a
classification of utterances which appears to give to the decisions an element of coherent
reasonableness which they lack.‖). Another writer observed, ―Rather than embarrass the
symmetry of his logical generalizations, he simply expelled admissions from the realm of the
hearsay exceptions.‖ Carl H. Harper, Admissions of Party-Opponents, 8 MERCER L. REV. 252, 253
(1957). Mr. Harper was the co-author of a book on the Georgia Rules of Evidence with Professor
Thomas Green, who went on to become a member of the Advisory Committee.
80. ―It may . . . be both ungrateful and unreasonable to wish that after his second edition
he had given a major portion of his limitless energy and extraordinary talent to a reexamination of
the entire subject, including his analysis and classification, paying particular attention to those
topics in which he had theretofore accepted the conclusions of other scholars.‖ Morgan, Book
Review, supra note 78, at 778.
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exception for all or some prior statements.
In the first edition of his treatise, Wigmore endorsed the orthodox
position on prior statements: they were admissible for impeachment
purposes but not for the truth of the matter asserted in the statements.
Wigmore placed his discussion of prior statements in the treatise section
entitled Testimonial Impeachment, in a chapter called Self-Contradiction.
He wrote that ―the prior statement is not hearsay, because it is not used
assertively, i.e. not testimonially.‖81
In the second edition, Wigmore changed his position slightly,
becoming the first major writer to endorse the substantive use of prior
statements. He amended his earlier statement to say that: ―the prior
statement is not primarily hearsay . . . . ―82 Wigmore then added a new
sub-section, in which he said:
It does not follow, however, that Prior Self-Contradictions, when
admitted, are to be treated as having no affirmative testimonial
value, and that any such credit is to be strictly denied them in the
mind of the tribunal. The only ground for doing so would be the
Hearsay rule. But the theory of the Hearsay rule is that an
extrajudicial statement is rejected because it was made out of
Court by an absent person not subject to cross-examination.
Here, however, by hypothesis the witness is present and subject
to cross-examination. There is ample opportunity to test him as
to the basis for his former statement. The whole purpose of the
Hearsay rule has been already satisfied. Hence there is nothing
to prevent the tribunal from giving such testimonial credit to the
extrajudicial statement as it may seem to deserve.83
In a footnote explaining the reason for his changed view, Wigmore
wrote, ―Further reflection . . . has shown the present writer that the natural
and correct solution is the one set forth in the text above. Compare the
theory of Admissions (post, §1048).‖84 This is the extent of Wigmore‘s
discussion of the substantive use of prior statements. He was an early
supporter, but his writing on this point was very sparse.
Morgan‘s writing on the classification of prior statements was less
developed than his work on admissions and showed some ambiguous and

81.
82.
83.
edition.
84.

2 WIGMORE (1st ed. 1904), supra note 26, §1018, at 1179.
2 WIGMORE (2d ed. 1923), supra note 46, §1018, at 459 (added word in boldface).
Id. at 460 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The text was identical in the 1940
Id. at 460 n.2.
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perhaps inconsistent use of language and concepts. Writing in 1938,
discussing prior recorded recollections and comparing them to prior
statements, he wrote that ―it is universally agreed that . . . prior statements
[when used as substantive evidence] are hearsay.‖85 Ten years later,
however, Morgan wrote that prior statements do ―not in fact involve in any
substantial degree any of the hearsay risks‖ and that ―there is no real reason
for classifying the evidence [of prior statements] as hearsay.‖86
It is unclear if Morgan was answering the whether question—should
prior statements be received as substantive evidence or excluded by the
hearsay rule—or the how question: If received, how should they be
classified? The fact that the witness is in-court, under oath, and subject to
cross-examination and observation meant, for Morgan, that there were no
significant ―hearsay dangers‖ and, for Wigmore, that the purposes of the
hearsay rule had been ―satisfied.‖ We shall see that the Reporter used this
very reason both to admit prior statements as substantive evidence and to
classify them as ―not hearsay‖ in the federal rules. Notwithstanding his
answer to his own question, as Reporter for the Model Code of Evidence,
Morgan drafted a code that treated prior statements as hearsay and then
placed them in a separate hearsay exception.
B. The Three Predecessor Codes
A major evidence code was drafted in each of the three decades prior
to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The first of these was
the Model Code of Evidence, approved by the American Law Institute in
1942. It was followed by the Uniform Rules of Evidence in 1954 and then
the California Evidence Rules in 1964. Each code influenced its successor,
and all of them strongly influenced the shape and content of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. The Model Code contributed the ―code‖ framework
used by the Federal Rules of Evidence, using general rules of broad
applicability on a selected number of topics, as opposed to a detailed
―catalog‖ of very detailed rules covering all topics or a ―creed‖ announcing
general principles.87 The Uniform Rules of Evidence provided the outline

85. Morgan, supra note 79, at 265.
86. Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept,
62 Harv. L. Rev. 177, 192, 196 (1948).
87. EDMUND M. MORGAN, Foreword to MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 1, 13 (1942). The
issue of the level of generality or specificity of the rules of evidence was very controversial at the
time and occasioned a sharp public disagreement between Wigmore and Morgan. The question
was: Should the model code be ―a catalog, a creed or a code‖? Id. Wigmore wanted a ―catalog,‖ a
detailed set of concrete rules, rather than a set of general principles. He had drafted such a catalog
in his own Code of Evidence, first published in 1910 and updated in 1935 and 1942. He also
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of code sections–nine articles, each on a different topic–that the Federal
Rules of Evidence followed with only few changes.88
The following paragraphs summarize each code‘s treatment of
admissions and prior statements. For purposes of the Rule 801(d) story,
these codes teach several important lessons. First, each of the codes
classified admissions and prior statements as hearsay and then provided a
specific hearsay exception to assure their admissibility. Second, two of the
codes simply listed the hearsay exceptions seriatim and did not attempt to
classify or organize them; California made a modest attempt at organization
with a separate grouping for prior statements and admissions, but did not
use Wigmore‘s trustworthiness/necessity template. Finally, although each
code had extensive commentary on many code sections, none of them
discussed the reason for treating admissions and prior statements as hearsay
exceptions and rejecting Wigmore‘s ―hearsay rule satisfied‖ classification.
They simply did what they did.
1. Admissions
The Model Code defined hearsay in Rule 501, Rule 502 excluded its
subject to exceptions, and Rules 503-529 listed all the exceptions, with four
exceptions for different categories of admissions.89 The commentary,
explained his preferred approach in a speech setting forth his six postulates of method and style.
John H. Wigmore, The American Law Institute Code of Evidence Rules: A Dissent, 28 A.B.A. J.
23 (1942). Judge Charles Clark preferred a ―creed,‖ consisting of several statements of general
principles. WM. DRAPER LEWIS, Introduction to MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE vii, xiv-xv (1942).
The A.L.I. held a debate on this topic at its 1941 meeting, with Wigmore, Clark, and Morgan each
presenting his approach to the members. After hearing the presentations, the Institute voted for
the ―code‖ framework, and every evidence codification since that vote has used that framework
and its intermediate level of generality. Thomas M. Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 IOWA L. REV. 413, 431-36 (1989). See generally, Michael Ariens,
Progress Is Our Only Product: Legal Reform and the Codification of Evidence Law, 17 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 213 (1992).
88. The Federal Rules of Evidence follow the topics and headings of the Uniform Rules of
Evidence for seven of the nine sections: Articles I, II, III, V, VII, VIII, and IX. Article IX of the
Uniform Rules incorporates both authentication and contents of writings while the Federal Rules
split those topics into two Articles: Article IX for authentication and Article X for contents. The
two codes differ only on the coverage in Articles IV and VI. Instead of relevance, Article IV of
the Uniform Rules deals with witnesses (covered in Article VI of the Federal Rules). And Article
VI of the Uniform Rules covers ―extrinsic policies‖ (found in Article IV, Rules 404-415 of the
Federal Rules).
While both codes are similar in their use of these Articles, they use different numbering
systems within each article and throughout the rules. The Uniform Rules proceed from Rule 1 to
Rule 72, with no separate numbering within each Article as is the case with the Federal Rules.
Thus, while the hearsay rules of the Uniform Rules are located in Article VIII, the hearsay rules
are numbered Rules 62-66. Under the Federal Rules, the hearsay rules, also located in Article
VIII, were numbered Rules 801-806 (and now, Rule 807).
89. The four separate exceptions for admissions were: Rule 505 for confessions, Rule 506
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written by Morgan as Reporter, noted that ―some commentators [such as
Wigmore] insist that admissions and confessions fall without the reason for
the hearsay rule . . . ― but concluded that ―there is now general agreement
that such evidence is received as tending to prove the truth of the matter
stated [and therefore is hearsay].‖ 90
The Uniform Rules had Rule 63 as an all-purpose hearsay rule both
defining hearsay and the hearsay exclusionary rule and then setting forth
thirty-one exceptions:
Rule 63. Hearsay Evidence Excluded — Exceptions. Evidence
of a statement which is made other than by a witness while
testifying at the hearing offered to prove the truth of the matter
stated is hearsay evidence and inadmissible except: (1) . . . ; (2) .
. . ; (3) . . .91
Exceptions (6), (7), (8) and (9) covered admissions. The only
comment to the admissions exceptions of the Uniform Rule is that ―[t]hey
adopt the policy of Model Rules 506, 507 and 508.‖ The California
Evidence Code treated admissions as hearsay and provided a basic
exception with several specific exceptions covering more detailed
categories.92
2. Prior Statements
The Model Code made prior statements admissible under an
exception, Rule 503(b), which provided simply: ―Evidence of a hearsay
declaration is admissible if the judge finds that the declarant . . . (b) is
present and subject to cross-examination.‖ 93
The Uniform Rules used similar language in Rule 63(1), providing an
exception for a ―statement previously made by a person who is present at
the hearing and available for cross-examination with respect to the
statement and its subject matter, provided the statement would be
admissible if made by the declarant while testifying as a witness.‖94

for party admissions, Rule 507 for authorized and adoptive admissions, and Rule 508 for vicarious
admissions.
90. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE RULE 501 cmt. b, at 227 (1942). The Comment also noted
that ―Hearsay within the definition includes admissions, confessions and former testimony.‖ Id.
91. UNIF. R. EVID. 63.
92. CAL. EVID. CODE §1220-1227 (West 1967).
93. This Model Code language requiring the witness to be ―present and subject to crossexamination‖ was used in the first draft of the Federal Rules of Evidence and changed in the
second and subsequent drafts to require actual testimony, not just a presence in court. See infra
Section III-A.
94. UNIF. R. EVID. 63(1) (1963) (repealed).
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The exceptions created by both the Model Code and the Uniform Rule
applied to all prior statements and required only that the declarant be
―present‖ and available for cross-examination, not actually testify. The
California Evidence Code—in a decision followed by the federal rules—
changed both these aspects. It created exceptions only for some prior
statements: prior inconsistent and prior consistent statements, past
recollection recorded, and statements of personal identification. And it
required that the declarant actually testify as a witness, and not simply be
present and available.95
The main story of the treatment of prior statements is consistent: the
predecessor codes classified them as hearsay and then created specific
exceptions. However, certain aspects of the Model Code and Uniform
Rules illustrate the difficulty of thinking clearly about the classification
issue and also foreshadow the problems with the drafting of Rule 801(d).
With the Model Code, it was the decision to treat depositions differently
than other types of prior statements. Instead of classifying them as a
hearsay exception, it ―excepted‖ them from its hearsay definition: ―A
hearsay statement is a statement of which evidence is offered as tending to
prove the truth of the matter intended to be asserted . . . except a statement .
. . contained in a deposition or other record of testimony taken and
recorded pursuant to law for use at the present trial.‖96 But more
interesting than this rule was its explanation. The Model Code comment
stated that the ―definition . . . distinguishes between testimony given in
another trial, making it hearsay (see Rule 511 [the exception for former
testimony]), and a deposition taken for use at the trial at which it is offered,
classifying it as non-hearsay. Some writers insist that no such distinction is
justifiable.‖97 This comment to Rule 501 is the first recorded use of the term
―not hearsay‖ in the Rule 801(d) sense, to describe evidence that is offered
to prove the truth of the matter asserted and is thus hearsay according to the
traditional definition but is then treated as ―non-hearsay‖ for a policy

95. CAL. EVID. CODE §1235-1237 (West 1967). The California exception for prior
inconsistent statements was broad (―if the statement is inconsistent with his testimony at the
hearing.‖). Id. at §1236. This exception became very well-known after the 1970 Supreme Court
decision in California v Green, an important early case discussing the Confrontation Clause
boundaries on hearsay exceptions. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
96. MODEL CODE OF EVID. 501(2) (1942) (emphasis added). The rule also ―excepted‖ a
statement ―made by a witness in the process of testifying at the present trial.‖ Id. As we will see
in Section III-A, the first draft of the Federal Rules of Evidence included both of these exceptions.
The deposition part was dropped in the second draft; the ―made by a witness‖ part in the third
draft.
97. MODEL CODE OF EVID. rule 501 cmt. at 228 (1942) (emphasis added).
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reason.98 The Model Code made depositions non-hearsay by ―excepting‖
them from the definition of hearsay, which was precisely the approach used
for both admissions and prior statements in the first two drafts of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. And this comment—the first such use of ―not
hearsay‖—was written by Morgan, the strong advocate of treating
admissions and prior statements as hearsay exceptions.
The Uniform Rule‘s wrinkle is similarly instructive. It appeared in the
Comment to Rule 63(1), the rule that created a hearsay exception for prior
statements. The comment read: ―[Rule 63(1)] has the support of modern
decisions which have held that evidence of prior consistent statements . . . is
not hearsay because the rights of confrontation and cross-examination are
not impaired.‖99
Note the anomaly: The drafters of the Uniform Rule had just created a
new hearsay exception for prior statements in Rule 63(1). Then, in the
comment to this exception, they wrote that ―evidence of prior consistent
statements is not hearsay.‖100 The drafters of the Federal Rules were not the
only ones who were confused and inconsistent.
III. THE DRAFTING OF RULE 801(d)
Led by Chairperson Albert Jenner and Reporter Edward Cleary, the
members of the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence101 worked
98. Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept,
62 HARV. L. REV. 177, 218-19 (1948). As mentioned in Section II-A, Morgan suggested in 1948
that ―there was no real reason for classifying the evidence of prior statements as hearsay.‖ Id. at
196. However, in no other place did he use the term ―non-hearsay‖ in this sense.
99. UNIF. R. EVID. 63(1) cmt. at 198 (1953).The drafters concluded the comment with a
bit of cheerleading: ―When sentiment is laid aside there is little basis for objection to this
enlightened modification of the rule against hearsay.‖ Id.
100. Id.
101. A contemporary account described the membership of the Advisory Committee as
follows:
The committee chairman was the well-known Illinois trial attorney and Warren
Commission counsel Albert Jenner, who had participated in drafting the Uniform
Rules of Evidence as a longtime Commissioner on Uniform State Laws. The panel
also included Judges Simon Sobeloff, Joe Estes, and Robert Van Pelt; Professors
(now federal judges) Jack Weinstein and Charles Joiner; Professor Thomas Green;
Herman Selvin, father of the pioneering California Evidence Code; former chief of
the Justice Department‘s Criminal Appeals Division, Robert Erdahl; and famed
litigators David Berger, Egbert Haywood, Frank Raichle, Craig Spangenberg,
Edward Bennett Williams, and the late Hicks Epton. The reporter was Professor
Edward Cleary [of the University of Illinois and then Arizona State].
Paul Rothstein, The Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEO. L.J. 125,
125 n.3 (1973).
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for six years (from June 1965 through November 1971). The committee
produced at least three internal drafts and then three separately published
versions of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1969, 1971, and 1973.102
At the first Advisory Committee meeting on June 18, 1965, after
general introductions,103 the Reporter gave the committee an overview of
the materials that he would be using in drafting the rules: ―Wigmore, . . .
McCormick, . . . a collection of law review articles, edited by a committee
of the American Law School Association, the Model Code of Evidence, . . .
Uniform Rules of Evidence, . . . and the report from the drafting of the
California code.‖104 Jenner handed out the table of contents of the three
predecessor codes and said that he would distribute a copy of the Kansas
Evidence Code (a state adoption of the Uniform Rules of Evidence) prior to
the next meeting.105 Cleary asked committee member Herman Selvin, a
member of the California Law Revision Commission, to speak briefly about
the California experience.106 He then led a discussion of federal-state issues
that would necessarily arise in a federal evidence code.107
The Committee discussed the Reporter‘s draft rules for the first time at
the second meeting in October 1965. The minutes reflect that the Reporter
made several basic points about his approach to drafting the federal rules,
before turning to a discussion of the specific rules on the agenda for that
meeting. 108 He said that in preparing the drafts, he had consulted the

102. See Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Preliminary Draft of
Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161
(1969); Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, Revised Draft Of Proposed Rules Of Evidence For The United States Courts And
Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315 (1971); Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates,
56 F.R.D. 183 (1973).
103. In addition to the members of the Advisory Committee, several members of the
Standing Committee on Federal Rules, including Professors William James Moore of Yale, and
Charles K. Wright of Texas, and Judge Alfred Maris, attended many of the committee‘s meetings.
Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure, Minutes of June 28, 1965, meeting 6, available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesandPolicies/rules/minutes/ST06-1965-min.pdf.
104. Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence, Minutes of June 18, 1965, meeting 5,
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/ResearchingRules/Minutes.aspx
105. Id. at 8.
106. Id at 5.
107. Id. at 7. The Reporter had addressed these issues in his Memorandum No. 1, as had
Professor Green‘s study of the advisability and feasibility of promulgating federal rules of
evidence. See Albert B. Maris, A Preliminary Report on the Advisability and Feasibility of
Developing Uniform Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts, 30 F.R.D. 73, 75-77
(1962).
108. See United States Courts, Minutes of Rules Committee Meetings, (October 1965)
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesandPolicies/rules/minutes/EV10-1965min.pdf.
The first topics addressed were authentication (discussed in the Reporter‘s
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Uniform Rules and the California Code.109 He then made three points about
style and approach, the second and third of which he overlooked when
drafting Rule 801(d): (1) definitions should be avoided whenever possible;
(2) words should be used in their ordinary meaning whenever possible; and
(3) he was drafting the rules to be as usable and accessible as possible.
In the next sub-sections, I describe in some detail the three drafts that
led to the creation of Rule 801(d) and the ―not hearsay‖ category. I then
present the reasons that the Reporter gave for the drafting choices and
criticize both those reasons and the failure of the Reporter and the Advisory
Committee to consider alternative approaches to the classification of
admissions and prior statements.
A. The Hearsay Rules: The First Three Drafts
The Advisory Committee discussed the hearsay rules over the course
of four meetings beginning in October 1967. Prior to the first hearsay
meeting, the Reporter presented the Advisory Committee with his first draft
of Rules 801-804, accompanied by Memorandum No. 19, a 185-page
memorandum that presented his suggested approach to hearsay and
included his reasons for not treating admissions and prior statements as
hearsay exceptions.110 After discussing the first draft in several meetings,
the Advisory Committee made changes and in December 1968 approved a
second draft. The second draft was published as the Preliminary Draft in
March 1969, being the first published work of the Advisory Committee.111
The third draft was prepared after the review of public comments on the

Memorandum No. 2), contents of writings (Memorandum No. 3), and expert testimony
(Memorandum No. 4). Id. at 2. The Chairperson and Reporter set the agenda for the Advisory
Committee‘s work and decided to address less controversial topics in their early meetings and to
leave the discussion of the hearsay rules and presumptions until the end. Prior to a meeting on a
topic, the Reporter prepared and circulated a memorandum on the topics for discussion at the
meetings, usually accompanied by a first draft of particular rules. See, e.g., Thomas F. Green, Jr.,
Highlights of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 4 GA. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1969).
109. Edward W. Cleary, The Plan for the Adoption of Rules of Evidence for United States
District Courts, 25 REC. ASS‘N B CITY N.Y. 142, 145-46 (1970). While not reflected in the
minutes, his drafting followed the general approach of the Model Code and the structure of the
Uniform Rules. Id.
110. See generally Advisory Committee on Evidence Memorandum No. 19: Article VIII
Hearsay: The Components of Credibility (Oct. 9, 1967-March 9, 1968), microformed on Nos. EV120-05 to EV-127-03 (Cong. Info. Serv.)[hereinafter Memorandum No. 19]. Parts of
Memorandum No. 19 became, in considerably reduced form, the Introductory Note on Hearsay
and the Advisory Committee Notes that accompanied the published drafts of the rules. The
Reporter did not include any of Memorandum No. 19‘s discussion of the reasons for classifying
admissions and prior statements as ―not hearsay‖ in the Advisory Committee Notes.
111. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence, 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969).
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Preliminary Draft and was published in 1971 as the Revised Draft.112 This
third draft created Rule 801(d) and the ―not hearsay‖ classification.
There are two important storylines in these three drafts, one involving
the classification of admissions and prior statements, the other the treatment
of the hearsay exceptions generally. With admissions and prior statements,
the form of the classification changed from Draft One to Draft Three, but
not the content. From the beginning, the Reporter recognized that, when
offered to prove their truth, these statements were not hearsay under the
traditional definition. In thinking about how to classify them, he had two
goals: first, to assure that they would be received into evidence and not be
excluded by the hearsay rule; and second, to make sure that they were not
classified as hearsay exceptions. Using two different techniques, he
accomplished the first goal by excluding them from the definition of
hearsay. In Drafts One and Two, in the definition section, Rule 8-01(c), he
explicitly excluded admissions and prior statements from the definition of
hearsay. In Draft Three, he created the new ―not hearsay‖ category in Rule
801(d) and placed them there. However, the goal, the result, and his
reasons were the same for all three drafts—to assure that these statements
would be received into evidence. With respect to the second goal, he could
and did keep them from being treated as hearsay exceptions, but he still
needed some other category in which to place them. In the first two drafts,
the category was only implied: if they were expressly excluded from the
hearsay definition, they must be ―not hearsay.‖ In the third draft, Rule
801(d) made the ―not hearsay‖ category explicit.
With the hearsay exceptions, there was a dramatic change from the
second to the third draft. The first two drafts followed an innovative
approach favored by the Reporter. Instead of the traditional list of
categorical exceptions, these drafts had only two hearsay exceptions, each
expressed in very general terms: ―A statement is not excluded by the
hearsay rule if its nature and the special circumstances under which it was
made offer assurances of accuracy not likely to be enhanced by calling the
declarant as a witness.‖113
112. Committe on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and
Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315 (1971). The Advisory Committee and the Standing Committee
submitted the second draft to the Supreme Court in October 1970, with the expectation that the
Court would promulgate it as the proposed rules. However, in order to give the public the
opportunity to comment on the many changes between the second and third drafts, the Court
decided instead to publish them as a revised draft.
113. FED. R. EVID. 8-03(a)-(b)(Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules 1969). Rule 8-04(a)
provided: ―A statement is not excluded by the hearsay rule if its nature and the special
circumstances under which it was made offer strong assurances of accuracy and the declarant is
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The purpose of these two general exceptions was to introduce
flexibility into what was seen as a ―rigid rule [marked] by numerous rigid
exceptions.‖114 However, after receiving a barrage of critical responses
during the public comment phase, the Reporter abandoned the innovative
approach and returned to the traditional categorical exceptions.
1. The Drafts: Admissions and Prior Statements
In the first draft, Rule 8-01(c)115 both defined hearsay and listed
several types of evidence (including admissions and prior statements)
specifically excluded from that definition:
8-01(c) Hearsay. ―Hearsay‖ is a statement, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter intended to be asserted, unless
(1) Testimony at hearing. The statement is one made by a witness
while testifying at the hearing;116 or
(2) Declarant present at hearing. The declarant is present at the
hearing and subject to cross-examination concerning the statement; or
(3) Deposition. The statement was made by a deponent in the course
of a deposition taken and offered in the proceeding in compliance with
applicable Rules of Civil or Criminal Procedure; or
(4) Admission by party-opponent. As against a party, the statement is
(i) his own statement, in either his individual or a
representative capacity, or
(ii) a statement by a person authorized by him to make a
statement concerning the subject, or
(iii) a statement of which he has manifested his adoption
or
belief in its truth, or
(iv) a statement concerning a matter within the scope of an

unavailable as a witness.‖ Professor Wellborn described these as ―nonformal‖ exceptions. Olin
Guy Wellborn III, Article VIII: Hearsay, 20 HOUS. L. REV. 477, 481 (1983).
114. Charles T. McCormick, The Borderland of Hearsay, 30 YALE L.J. 489, 504 (1930).
The first two drafts used the traditional hearsay exceptions, not as categorical exceptions as in the
common law and the prior codes, but as examples to illustrate the nature and scope of the two
general categories.
115. The numbering system in the first two drafts was 8-01, 8-02, 8-03, etc. See, e.g.,
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence, 46 F.R.D. at 168. Not until the third draft did
the Reporter propose the numbering system, 801, 802, 803, etc., used in the current rules. See,
e.g., Committee of Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates,
51 F.R.D. 315, 320 (1971).
116. This awkward approach—explicitly excluding an in-court witness‘s testimony from
the definition of hearsay—was pioneered by the Model Code. See Section II-B, infra. The third
draft rejected this language, replacing it with the ―other than by a witness. . . ‖ language from
Uniform Rule 63. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 63(1).
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agency or employment of the declarant for the party,
made
before the termination of the relationship, or
(v) a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the
course and in furtherance of the conspiracy, or
(vi) a statement tending to establish the legal liability of the
declarant when that liability is in issue.117
The second draft continued the same approach but tightened the
requirements for prior statements, both to specify that the declarant must
testify (and not merely be present) and to exclude from the definition of
hearsay only certain specified prior statements, not all as in the first draft. It
also deleted the treatment of depositions, on the grounds that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure already addressed the topic.118
Language new in the Second Draft is highlighted in a light grey;
language stricken from the First Draft is marked by a single strikethrough.
8-01(c) Hearsay. ―Hearsay‖ is a statement, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter intended to be asserted, unless
(1) Testimony at hearing. The statement is one made by a witness
while testifying at the trial or hearing; or
(2) Declarant present at hearing. Prior Statement By Witness The
declarant is present at the hearing testifies at the trial or hearing and is
subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the
statement is (i) inconsistent with his testimony, or (ii) consistent with
his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge
against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or
(iii) one of identification of a person made soon after perceiving him,
or (iv) a transcript of testimony given under oath at a trial or hearing
or before a grand jury;
(3) Deposition. The statement was made by a deponent in the course
of a deposition taken and offered in the proceeding in compliance with
applicable Rules of Civil or Criminal Procedure; or
(3) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered As against
a party, the statement is
(i) his own statement, in either his individual or a
representative capacity, or
(ii)119 a statement of which he has manifested his adoption or

117. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence, supra note 102, 46 F.R.D. at 168.
118. Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence Meeting of Oct. 9-11,
1967, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/EV10-1967min.pdf
119. The second draft switched the order of the placement of adoptive admissions and
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belief in its truth,
(iii) a statement by a person authorized by him to make a
statement concerning the subject, or
(iv) a statement concerning a matter within the scope of an
agency or employment of the declarant for the party, made
before the termination of the relationship, or
(v) a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the
course and in furtherance of the conspiracy, or
(vi) a statement tending to establish the legal liability of the
declarant when that liability is in issue.120
The big change came in the third draft with the creation of Rule
801(d) and the ―not hearsay category.‖ Once created, this classification
portion of Rule 801(d) remained untouched and unchanged,
notwithstanding the numerous revisions and amendments to other rules.
The admissions and prior statements sections were transferred from Rule 801(c)(2) and (3) into the newly created Rule 801(d)(1) and (2). With the
transfer out of those sub-sections and the addition of the ―out-of-court‖
language (―other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial
or hearing‖), Rule 801(c) assumed its current form as the now-familiar
hearsay definition.
Language new to the third draft is highlighted in a dark grey.
Language stricken from the second draft is marked by a double
strikethrough:
801(c) Hearsay. ―Hearsay‖ is a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter intended to be asserted. , unless
(1)Testimony at hearing.
(2)Declarant present at hearing[moved to Rule 801(d)(1)
(3) Admissions by party opponent[moved to Rule 801(d)(2)]
(d) Statements Which Are Not Hearsay. A statement is not hearsay
if
(1) Prior Statement by Witness. [content of rule transferred from
the former 801(c)(2)]
(2) Admission By Party-Opponent [content of rule transferred from
the former 801(c)(3)]121

authorized admissions.
120. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence, supra note 102, 46 F.R.D. at 331,
332.
121. FED. R. EVID. 801(c); see also Revised Draft of Proposed Rules, 51 F.R.D. 315, 413
(1971).

Stonefield 6-13-11 (Do Not Delete)

2011]

6/13/2011 9:38 AM

Rule 801(d)’s Oxymoronic “Not Hearsay” Classification

35

2. The Drafts: The Hearsay Exceptions
Using the Reporter‘s innovative approach to the hearsay exceptions,
the first two drafts had only two general hearsay exceptions, followed by
list of specific exceptions ―by way of illustration.‖
8-03 Hearsay Exceptions. Declarant Not Unavailable
(a) GENERAL PROVISIONS. A statement is not excluded by the
hearsay rule if its nature and the special circumstances under
which it was made offer assurances of accuracy not likely to be
enhanced by calling the declarant as a witness, even though he is
available.
(b) ILLUSTRATION. By way of illustration only, and not by way
of limitation, the following are examples of statements
conforming with the requirements of this rule: (1) present sense
impression, (2), . . . (23)
8-04 Hearsay Exceptions. Declarant Unavailable
(a) GENERAL PROVISIONS A statement is not excluded by
the hearsay rule if its nature and the special circumstances under
which it was made offer strong assurances of accuracy and the
declarant is unavailable as a witness.
(b) ILLUSTRATION. By way of illustration only, and not by way
of limitation, the following are examples of statements
conforming with the requirements of this rule: (1) dying
declaration; (2) . . . .122
There were only two minor changes from the first to the second draft.
The title of Rule 8-03 was changed to ―Availability of Declarant
Immaterial,‖ and the illustrative exception of Past Recorded Recollection
was changed from 8-03(21) to 8-03(5).
There was a major change in the third draft, which was prepared after
the review of public comments on the Preliminary Draft and published in
1971 as the Revised Draft.123 In response to strong objections from the bar,
the third draft abandoned the innovative approach of using two general
exceptions, with the traditional hearsay exceptions only as illustrative
guides, and returned to the common law approach of categorical hearsay
exceptions.
It still retained the two general categories—declarant
availability immaterial and declarant unavailable—and grouped the hearsay
exceptions within these two categories, but these two categories were now

122. FED. R. EVID. 8-03-8-04 (Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules).
123. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States Courts and Magistrates, 315 F.R.D. 315 (1971).
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just groupings of specific categorical exceptions, and not themselves
general exceptions. The third draft also created the new residual
exceptions, Rule 803(24) and Rule 804(b)(5), combined and recodified in
1997 as Rule 807. Finally, it changed the numbering system from one with
a hyphen after the first number (1-01, 2-01, 3-01) to one with 3-digit
numbers (101, 201, 301).
803Hearsay Exceptions. Availability of Declarant Immaterial
(a) GENERAL PROVISIONS. A statement is not excluded . . .
(b) ILLUSTRATION. By way of illustration only, . . .
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though
the declarant is available as a witness: [803(1)-(23) transferred
from 803(b); 803(24) is the new residual exception]
804 Hearsay Exceptions: Declarant Unavailable
(a) GENERAL PROVISIONS. A statement is not excluded . . .
(b) ILLUSTRATION. By way of illustration only, . . .
(a) Definition of Unavailability. – From former 8-01(d)
(b) Hearsay Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the
hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
[804(b)(1)-(4) are same; 804(b)(5) is the new residual
exception]124
B. The Reasons Given for the “Not Hearsay” Classification
This part presents, in the Reporter‘s own words, the reasons—separate
for each type of statement—for the Federal Rules treatment of admissions
and prior statements. Section III-C then discusses those reasons and
demonstrates why they did not justify the decision to classify them as ―not
hearsay.‖

1. Admissions
In Memorandum No.19, the Reporter noted that ―the question whether

124. Compare FED. R. EVID. 803-804; with 51 F.R.D. 315, 419-40 (Revised Draft of
Proposed Rules 1971).

Stonefield 6-13-11 (Do Not Delete)

2011]

6/13/2011 9:38 AM

Rule 801(d)’s Oxymoronic “Not Hearsay” Classification

37

a particular type of statement-evidence is classed as nonhearsay or as
hearsay-but-under-exception may seem on first impression to be mere
terminological quibbling: in either event the hearsay rule does not call for
exclusion.‖125 He then went on to say:
If, however, the Committee is favorably disposed to the general
design of the over-all proposed approach to hearsay, it is
desirable to eliminate admissions from the category of hearsay as
it will not fit comfortably into either of the major exception
groups laid out in proposed Rules 8-03 and 8-04.126
The phrase—‖it will not fit comfortably‖—was the Reporter‘s reason
for his treatment of admissions.127 This ―bad fit‖ rationale is in part
tautological: if Rule 8-03(a) and its illustrative exceptions required
reliability and Rule 8-04(a) and its illustrative exceptions required
unavailability, then admissions by definition did not meet those
requirements. But there were also policy reasons: the Reporter wanted to
avoid the harms that he felt a ―bad fit‖ would cause both to admissions and
to the hearsay exceptions. What were those harms?
The ―bad fit‖ had two possible negative consequences: (1) a
contraction in the scope of the admissions exception, so that all admissions
would have some ―assurances of accuracy‖ or (2) an expansion in the
hearsay admitted with no assurance of accuracy.128 The Reporter wrote that
if admissions were placed as an illustrative exception in Rule 8-03(b), there
would be pressure on courts ―to discard the traditional free-wheeling
common law treatment [for admissions] and to search instead for some
assurances of reliability.‖129 Courts might narrow the admissions exception
in order to make it more reliable (as required by Rule 8-03), and the
Reporter thought that this would be an undesirable outcome.
While the Reporter did not directly discuss the impact of a ―bad fit‖ on

125. Memorandum No. 19, supra note 107, at 86.
126. Id. This passage concluded, ―See Reporter‘s Memo of 9/12-67.‖ Id. Unfortunately,
an exhaustive search of the Judicial Conference records has failed to produce that memo. See
record of an August 2, 2010 voicemail from Elizabeth Endicott, librarian at the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 2, 2010) (on file with author).
127. Memorandum No. 19, supra note 107, at 86.
128. As discussed in the next sub-section, while an expansion of the unenumerated
exceptions seems to this writer a more likely outcome than a contraction of the admissions
exception, the impact either way would likely be quite small. And any impact, in either direction,
could be easily eliminated by placing admissions into its own, separate hearsay exception, apart
from either Rule 803 or Rule 804, so that neither the admissions exception nor the Rule 803 or
804 exceptions would cross-contaminate the other. But there is no indication that the Reporter or
the Advisory Committee considered or evaluated such a separate exception.
129. Memorandum No. 19, supra note 107, at 87.
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the hearsay exceptions, one can easily infer the harm that he feared—that
admissions would distort (and likely expand) the interpretation of the new
general hearsay exception. If admissions were listed as an ―illustrative
exception‖ as an example of the type of evidence that has the ―assurances of
accuracy‖ required by Rule 8-03(a), then courts would be inclined (or
pressured) to admit other statements which, like some admissions, have no
―assurances of accuracy.‖
There was only mild questioning of the Reporter‘s treatment of
admissions during the drafting stage. At the first hearsay meeting, the
Reporter provided a general overview of his approach to hearsay and, in
response to introductory questioning, said that he would ―exclude
admissions from hearsay by definition‖ and that ―he would simply say that
admission is not hearsay.‖130 The minutes reflect that the members were
pleased with his overall approach.131 At the December 1967 meeting,
Advisory Committee member Craig Spangenburg asked why admissions
should not be treated as a hearsay exception.132 The Reporter responded by
saying that he would prefer to wait to discuss that issue until the next
meeting, when they would be discussing Rule 803 and his suggested
approach to the hearsay exceptions.133 At the next meeting in March, 1968,
the Reporter raised the issue again and pointed out how admissions have
―no real circumstantial guarantee of proof . . . [and] . . . just did not fit into
Rule 8-03.‖134 After that presentation, the Advisory Committee voted
unanimously to approve the treatment of admissions.135
Although there is no further record of Committee discussion of the
matter, Advisory Committee member Professor Thomas Green wrote
briefly in support of the original Rule 8-03(c) position in an article
published while the preliminary rules were still under consideration.
Professor Green gave two distinct and internally inconsistent reasons for
excluding admissions from the definition of hearsay. His first reason was
the same as the Reporter‘s—that admissions do not fit well into the general

130. Minutes of The Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence meeting of October 9-11,
1967,at 33, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/EV101967-min.pdf.
131. Id. at 33-35.
132. Minutes of The Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence meeting of December 14
& 15, 1967, at 4 available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/EV12-1967-min.pdf.
133. Id.
134. Minutes of the The Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence, Meeting of March
1968, at 17 available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/EV031968-min.pdf.
135. Id. at 17-18.
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theory of the hearsay exceptions.136 Secondly, he wrote that admissions
should be thought of as circumstantial evidence of conduct, and not as
hearsay.137 He did not (nor did the Reporter or any other Advisory
Committee member) advance Wigmore‘s ―hearsay rule satisfied‖ position
to justify the different treatment of admissions.
Only three of the many comments recorded in the Advisory
Committee‘s internal records addressed Rule 8-01(c)‘s exclusion of
admissions from the definition of hearsay. Two letters expressed
support.138 A third letter, from attorney Leonard Rubin, opposed it and
suggested that admissions be treated as a hearsay exception.139 Stating that
admissions had always been treated as exceptions and were so treated by
the Model Code and the Uniform Rules, he argued that ―[t]here seems to be
no justification for excluding the statements . . . from the definition of
hearsay.‖140 Recognizing that admissions did not fit within the parameters
of the Rule 803 and Rule 804 exceptions, attorney Rubin suggested that
admissions and prior statements should be listed separately as ―General
Exceptions,‖ a suggestion very similar to the ―four categories‖ approach
recommended in Section VI. 141
While the Reporter did not expressly comment on attorney Rubin‘s
suggestion, he did discuss the treatment of admissions in his response to the
comments from several organizations on Rule 8-01(c) and Rules 8-03 and
8-04 in a May, 1970 memo.142 In several fascinating sentences, he
described two alternative approaches, one that became Rule 801(d) and the
other that never surfaced again. First, he wrote, ―An alternative [will] be to
place them in a special subsection (d) with a prefatory statement, ‗A

136. Thomas F. Green, Jr., Highlights of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 4 GA.
L. REV. 1, 39 (1969).
137. Id. This was the approach favored by the early Wigmore and, as we will see, one of
his supporters, Professor John Strahorn.
138. Letters from American College of Trial Lawyers and ABA Section on Litigation,
microformed on Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference: Committees on Rules of Practice and
Procedures, 1935-1988, CIS No. EV-305-01, EV-614-58 (Cong. Info. Serv.).
139. Letter from Leonard H. Rubin to Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
(August 27, 1969), microformed on Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference: Committees on
Rules of Practice and Procedures, 1935-1988, CIS No. EV-501-19 (Cong. Info. Serv.).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Memorandum from Edward Cleary, May 21-27, 1970, microformed on Records of
the U.S. Judicial Conference: Committees on Rules of Practice and Procedures, 1935-1988 CIS
No. Ev-214-94 (Cong. Info. Serv.). He stated that adding the phrase ―other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing‖ to Rule 8-01(c) ―may [be] an improvement,‖ and
noted that, if the change were made, Rules 8-01(c)(2)(prior statements) and (3)(admissions) would
have to be renumbered. Id.
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statement is not hearsay if . . . . ‖143 Here, in May, 1970, is the first
expression of the ―special‖ Rule 801(d) and the new ―not hearsay‖ category.
While the memo did not provide his reasons for the special section concept,
he advanced it while he was reworking the text of Rule 801(c), the hearsay
definition section. It is likely that the Reporter decided to keep Rule 801(c)
clean, uncluttered, and focused on the definition of hearsay, which meant
that he needed another place for admissions and prior statements. Perhaps
the Reporter also decided that, in drafting terms, it was clearer and better to
have an explicitly labeled ―not hearsay‖ category under Rule 801(d), as
opposed to relying on a default non-hearsay category implied from the
exclusion from hearsay in Rule 8-01(c).
Even more dramatically, the Reporter immediately followed this
suggestion by briefly sketching another possibility:
A further alternative treatment of (2) and (3) is available if the
Advisory Committee should adopt the general approach to
hearsay suggested by the ABA Committees and the American
College Committee, i.e., transpose the present illustrations into
exceptions and add a growth and development section. Prior
statements . . . and admissions . . . coul[d] then be included in the
itemization of exceptions, since the pressures of logic and
organization would no longer require that they be excluded from
the definition of hearsay rather than included in the exceptions.144
Including admissions and prior statements ―in the itemization of
exceptions‖ was precisely the approach of the three predecessor codes.145
His brief presentation did not address how to deal with the distinctiveness
of admissions and prior statements and the fact that, as he had previously
argued, they do not fit well with either the Rule 803 or Rule 804 categories.
However, once he had abandoned his initial innovative approach to the
hearsay exceptions, he was free of ―the pressures of logic and organization‖
imposed by that approach and was able, for one brief moment in May 1970,
to consider treating admissions and prior statements as exceptions.146
His May 1970 memorandum is the final written word on the
classification issue.147 In its third draft, the Advisory Committee selected

143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. The classification was addressed one additional time, but only indirectly. The Senate
Committee on the Judiciary noticed a potential coverage gap in Rule 806, the rule governing
impeachment of hearsay declarants, for the makers of out-of-court statements falling under Rule
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the first alternative presented in the memo—the creation of Rule 801(d).
There is no record of the reason(s) for this selection. By the time of the
third draft, the Reporter and Advisory Committee were near the end of a
six-year drafting process, and the documentation of their work, in terms of
minutes and memoranda, had virtually stopped.148
The lack of
contemporaneous records at this final, critical moment is a disappointment.
However, working from the records that we do have, it seems clear that the
reason for creating a new Rule 801(d) with the ―not hearsay‖ terminology in
the third draft was the same as the reason for excluding admissions and
prior statements from the definition of hearsay in Rule 8-01(c) in the first
two drafts. It was the ―will not fit comfortably‖ reason given at the outset
in Memorandum No. 19.149
2. Prior Statements
Most of the Reporter‘s discussion of prior statements in Memorandum
No. 19 concerned the admissibility issue, not the classification issue. This
focus was understandable because, at the time of the drafting, the orthodox
rule was still the majority rule. The Reporter, like reformers before and
since, wanted to change the orthodox rule and make most prior statements
generally admissible. He used the pertinent sections of Memorandum No.
19, and later the text of the ACN, to make the case for this broader
admissibility.
When he did touch briefly on the classification issue, his treatment of
prior statements was quite different than admissions. Whereas his
discussion of admissions omitted the predecessor codes, his discussion of
prior statements began by noting that both the Model Code and the Uniform
Rules treated prior statements as a hearsay exception and then stated that his
proposal treated them ―as not falling in the category of hearsay in the first
801(d)(2)(C), (D) and (E). It proposed amending Rule 806 to read, ―[w]hen a hearsay statement,
or a statement defined in Rule 801(d)(2),(C), (D), or (E), has been admitted in evidence, the
credibility of the declarant may be attacked . . . . ‖ FED R. EVID. 806 advisory committee‘s note
(emphasis added to indicate new language). The Committee report seemed to understand and to
accept the Reporter‘s classification, noting ― the reason such statements are excluded from the
operation of rule 806 is likely attributable to the drafting technique used to codify the hearsay rule,
viz. some statements, instead of being referred to as exceptions to the hearsay rule, are defined as
statements which are not hearsay.‖ FED R. EVID. 806 advisory committee‘s note.
148. The May 1970 memorandum is the last memo in the microfiche file. The Committee
had meetings in May and December,1970. There are minutes for the May meeting, which
discussed the revisions through Rule 406, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/EV05-1970-min.pdf.
There
are no records of minutes of the December 1970 meeting, where the decision to adopt Rule 801(d)
was presumably discussed and approved.
149. Memorandum No. 19, supra note 107, at 86.
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place.‖150 Observing that ―the result is the same, . . . [i]n either event the
hearsay rule does not operate to exclude the evidence,‖151 he concluded,
―[I]n view of the Reporter, the basis for not excluding the evidence is that
the conditions of giving testimony are satisfied, and hence logic dictates a
classification as non-hearsay.‖152 Although he did not cite Wigmore at this
point, this rationale for classifying prior statements as non-hearsay is
identical to Wigmore‘s rationale for placing all prior statements in the
―hearsay rule satisfied‖ category. Because the witness is in court and
testifying under oath, the testimonial conditions are met and the purposes of
the hearsay rule are satisfied.
Interestingly, the Reporter did not use ―bad fit‖ and incompatibility
with Rule 803/Rule 804 as a rationale for treating them as ―not hearsay.‖ If
he had done so, however, he would have observed that prior statements
have the same issue as admissions—they do not ―fit comfortably‖ with
either Rule 803 or Rule 804, because of the requirement with prior
statements that the declarant appear as a witness.153
The minutes indicate that, when the Advisory Committee discussed
the treatment of prior statements at both the October 1967 and May 1968
meetings, their discussion focused almost exclusively on whether, and to
what extent, to admit prior statements as substantive evidence, and not on
the how question. Interestingly, in support of admitting prior statements,
Judge Weinstein made reference to New Jersey Rule 63(1), adopted from
the Uniform Rules, and the Reporter made reference to the California
Evidence Code.154 Both of these states had recently decided to admit prior
statements as substantive evidence, but as a hearsay exception, not as ―not
hearsay.‖ The minutes do not reflect whether Judge Weinstein and the
Reporter called attention to the ―hearsay exception‖ aspect, as well as the
substantive admissibility aspect, of the New Jersey and California codes.

150. Id. at 65.
151. Id. at 66.
152. Id.
153. Presumably the Reporter would have also thought that ―bad fit‖ would cause
analogous distorting effects, although the direction of the distortion would be different, since prior
statements have such strong assurances of reliability. It would tend to shrink the exceptions,
whereas including admissions as an exception would tend to enlarge them.
154. Minutes of the Fed. R. Evid. Advisory Committee Meeting of October 9-11, 1967 at
40, 42, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/EV101967-min.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2010). Dean Joiner cited a Kansas case, which was decided
under the Kansas version of the Uniform Rules. Id. at 46. Chairperson Jenner also cited the New
Jersey rule and said that it was ―equivalent to what was being presented by this proposed rule.‖
Id.
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C. Evaluating the Reporter’s Reasons
The assessment of the Reporter‘s reasons for treating admissions and
prior statements as he did and creating Rule 801(d) depends on the question
asked and the criteria used to evaluate the answer. If the question is ‗are
admissions and prior statements different from the other hearsay exceptions
and should they be treated differently?‘ then the answer is yes, and the
Reporter‘s reasons are fully satisfactory. Those reasons fully support the
negative decision of how not to classify admissions. If there are only two
categories of hearsay exceptions, one based on reliability and with the
availability of the declarant immaterial and the other based on necessity and
requiring that the declarant be unavailable, it makes sense not to place
admissions and prior statements into either of those exceptions.
However, his reasons do not help in making the more important
affirmative decision and answering the how question actually before the
Advisory Committee: how should admissions and prior statements be
classified in an evidence code? Should they be treated, as Wigmore once
urged, as non hearsay in the traditional, definitional sense? Should they be
excluded from the definition of hearsay (as in drafts one and two)? Or is it
better to follow the Model Code, the Uniform Rules and the California
Evidence Code, and treat admissions and prior statements as hearsay but
then, in recognition of their distinctiveness, place them in their own hearsay
exception? Or should they be placed in new, separate categories and, if so,
should those new categories be separate hearsay exceptions or something
called ―not hearsay‖?
There are two possible approaches to answering the how question.
The one that I favor and demonstrate in Section VI uses criteria drawn from
the standards of rule drafting—primarily clarity and consistency—and then
applies those criteria to the various possible ways of classifying admissions
and prior statements.155 Unfortunately, the Reporter and the Advisory
Committee did not follow this approach.
Instead, to the extent that they even recognized the how question, the
Reporter and Advisory Committee used an approach that relied on two
other factors: first, the protection of the Reporter‘s goal of rationalizing the
hearsay exceptions; and second, a scholarly assessment of the essential
nature of admissions and prior statements. I will discuss and evaluate these

155. See discussion infra Part VI. As discussed in Section VI, there is also a secondary
factor that I call ―educational‖: the ability of the classification to educate users as to the
distinctiveness of admissions and prior statements and their differences from the out-of-court
statements covered by the other hearsay exceptions.
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two factors in turn.
1. Rationalizing the Hearsay Exceptions
The Reporter was strongly committed to creating a rational system for
the hearsay exceptions. While noting that some writers had been skeptical
about such a project,156 ―the Reporter believes that the hearsay exceptions
may be seen in larger outlines of acceptable rationality.‖157 His plan for
achieving ―acceptable rationality‖ consisted ―of recognizing two general
exceptions to the rule excluding hearsay, one prescribing conditions for
declarations of unavailable declarants and the other prescribing conditions
for declarations without regard to whether declarant is unavailable.‖158 He
used the traditional hearsay exceptions, not as categorical exceptions as in
the common law and the prior codes, but as examples to illustrate the nature
and scope of these two general exceptions. He hoped that the general
exceptions would ―encourage growth and development in this area of the
law‖ while the illustrative traditional exceptions would ―preserv[e] the
values of the past . . . . ‖159
The Reporter‘s approach to the exceptions drew strong criticism
during the public comment period following the publication of the
Preliminary Draft. Critics argued that the ―illustrative‖ approach would
vest too much discretion with the trial judge and create conditions of
uncertainty that would make it difficult to prepare adequately for trial.
Several groups suggested that the Committee return to the common law

156. Memorandum No. 19, supra note 107, at 23. He quoted two of the skeptics: Morgan
(hearsay is ―‗a conglomeration of inconsistencies due to the application of competing theories
haphazardly applied,‖) and Chadbourne (―To admit some, but to stop short of admitting all,
declarations of unavailable declarants and to perform the operation on a rational basis is, as
experience has proved, a difficult endeavor.‖). Id.
157. Id. at 24. In the Introductory Hearsay Note that accompanied the preliminary draft,
the Reporter identified three approaches to the hearsay exceptions and wrote that the federal rules
were taking the third approach, that of ―rationalizing the hearsay exceptions.‖ In remarks to the
New York City Bar shortly after the publication of Preliminary Draft, he said that he sought to
accomplish two things in the proposed hearsay rules:
[O]ne is to weave the values of the traditional hearsay rule into a cohesive pattern, in
lieu of a crazy quilt, and the other is to reverse the unhappy process . . . by which
justifications are transformed into requirements, resulting in more and more and
smaller and smaller pigeonholes into which things must be fitted. Accordingly Rule
8-03 and 8-04 set forth in broad outline two large categories of hearsay exceptions .
...
Edward W. Cleary, The Plan for Adoption of Rules of Evidence for United States District Courts,
25 REC. ASS‘N B. CITY N.Y. 142, 150 (1970).
158. Memorandum No. 19, supra note 107, at 24.
159. Id.
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approach, change the illustrations to categorical hearsay exceptions, and
then add a separate residual exception to provide for future growth.160
In the 1971 Revised Draft, the Reporter yielded to the criticism and
retreated to the current system of categorical exceptions. He revised the
Introductory Note: The Hearsay Problem for the third draft, so that the rules
were no longer ―rationalizing‖ the hearsay exceptions (as stated in the first
draft of the Introductory Note) but instead used the approach ―of the
common law, i.[]e., a general rule excluding hearsay, with exceptions under
which evidence is not required to be excluded even though hearsay.‖161 The
exceptions were then ―collected under two rules.‖162 The Third Draft thus
transformed Rules 8-03(a) and 8-04(a) from broadly-phrased general
exceptions into largely ceremonial headings in which the traditional hearsay
exceptions were ―collected.‖
As we have seen, the Reporter thought that admissions and prior
statements were a ―bad fit‖ that would undermine the rationality and distort
the interpretation of the hearsay exceptions. There are two minor problems
with this view. First, like Wigmore, he achieved some semblance of
rationality for the hearsay exceptions by using Wigmore‘s technique of not
considering some types of evidence as hearsay exceptions. Second, the
importance of the Reporter‘s concern was undermined when he replaced the
general exceptions with the categorical exceptions in the third draft, as he
recognized in his May 20, 1970 memorandum.163 But the fundamental
problem with the Reporter‘s ―bad fit‖ concern is that it addresses only the
negative decision to exclude admissions and prior statements from those
categories of hearsay exceptions and is simply non-responsive to the
important question of how they should be classified. It does not

160. REPORT OF AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS: Committee to Study the
Proposed Rules of Evidence for United States District Courts and Magistrates (Feb. 1970),
microformed on Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference: Committees on Rules of Practice and
Procedures, 1935-1988 CIS, No. EV-305 (Cong. Info. Serv.).
161. FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee‘s note (Introductory Note: The Hearsay
Problem); see also Revised Draft of the Proposed Rules of Evidence, 51 F.R.D. 315, 411 (1971).
162. Id.
163. There are two supplemental points about the rationalizing goal after the third draft.
First, one might argue that that it is still necessary to avoid treating admissions and prior
statements as exceptions, to prevent them from distorting the residual exceptions (then 803(24)
and 804(b)(5), now Rule 807), in the manner discussed with the ―bad fit‖ supra. To the extent
that there is a distortion problem, it can be addressed and eliminated in the language of the
residual exception more effectively than by creating a ―not hearsay‖ category. Second, the
validity, if any, of the rationalizing/ anti-distortion goal has been somewhat undermined by the
promulgation of the Rule 804(b)(6), a hearsay exception that has no claim to reliability and
therefore could, if the Reporter‘s fears are correct, distort the interpretation of the residual
exception. FED. R. EVID. 804(b).
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affirmatively justify the decision to classify them as ―not hearsay.‖
2. Scholarly Assessment
The Reporter‘s treatment of the extensive scholarship on admissions
was incomplete, inaccurate, and misleading. Because the Reporter‘s
inaccuracies and misrepresentations were so striking, I discuss his treatment
of admissions at considerable length and then follow with a much briefer
review of prior statements.
The Reporter began his discussion of admissions by observing that
―[t]he authorities have differed in some measure‖ in their views on
admissions and then noting that Wigmore changed his position based on the
influence of Morgan‘s writing.164 However, he never clearly explained
either Wigmore‘s original or Morgan‘s contrary position. After noting that
Wigmore placed the admissibility of admissions on two grounds
(inconsistency and self-contradiction of a witness, and the incongruity of a
party objecting to the lack of opportunity to cross-examine himself), the
Reporter stated that ―[Wigmore] concluded that admissions were not
hearsay.‖165
His claim that Wigmore ―concluded that admissions were not hearsay‖
was an oversimplification that obscured three important points in thinking
about the appropriate classification. First, when admissions are offered for
self-contradiction, they are not offered for their truth and thus are not
hearsay under the traditional definition (Wigmore called this use ―hearsay
rule inapplicable‖). Wigmore held this position in the first edition of the
Treatise but modified it in the second and third editions. Second, Wigmore
treated admissions used as substantive evidence as ―hearsay rule satisfied,‖
a category that also included former testimony and depositions. Thus, using
Wigmore as authority for classifying admissions as non hearsay would also
suggest using him as authority for similarly classifying former testimony
(or explaining the reasons for not doing so). Finally, Wigmore never used
the term ―not hearsay‖ in this manner. For Wigmore, admissions offered as
substantive evidence were hearsay, but the hearsay exclusionary rule did
not apply because its purpose had been satisfied.
The Reporter was even more misleading when he discussed the views
of two other scholars, Professor John Strahorn and Dean Charles
McCormick. The Reporter praised one of Strahorn‘s articles as ―perhaps
the most searching examination yet made of the hearsay rule.‖166 Like
164.
165.
166.

Memorandum No. 19, supra note 107, at 87.
Id.
Id. at 89; See generally John S. Strahorn, A Reconsideration of the Hearsay Rule and
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Wigmore, Strahorn was a relentless classifier. Modifying Wigmore‘s
terminology, he placed all out-of-court statements into three categories: (1)
the hearsay rule inapplicable (for evidence that was not offered to prove its
truth and thus was not hearsay under the traditional view); (2) the hearsay
rule partially satisfied (for former testimony and past recollection recorded);
and (3) the ―genuine hearsay exceptions.‖167 Strahorn placed admissions in
the hearsay rule inapplicable category.
For Strahorn, admissions did not qualify as a ―genuine hearsay
exception‖ or fit into his ―hearsay rule partially satisfied‖ category. After
looking at the special circumstances under which admissions are received
into evidence (including the lack of personal knowledge or competence
requirements and the allowance of opinions),168 he concluded that
admissions have ―nothing in common with the genuine hearsay exceptions
and totally lack[] the identifying features found in all of them.‖ 169 They
also did not fit his ―hearsay rule partially satisfied‖ category, which was for
out-of-court statements that met most, but not all, of what he called the
―conditioning device[s]‖ that assured the trustworthiness of the
testimony.170 That category contained only two types of statements: former
testimony (where only demeanor is missing) and past recollection recorded
(where the ―conditioning devices‖ are applied to the witness in the
courtroom and not at the time of the making of the statement).171
Admissions did not fit this category because ―the concept of the party‘s
‗cross-examining‘ himself, or applying the conditioning devices to himself,
seems an awkward one.‖172 At this point, Strahorn considered either adding
a fourth category for admissions, ―hearsay rule waived,‖ or making
admissions a second sub-category of the hearsay rule inapplicable category,
but decided that ―to have to fall back on waiver or estoppel is very weak
analysis.‖173
Strahorn concluded that admissions fit into the hearsay rule
Admissions (pts. 1 & 2) 85 U. PA. L. REV 484, 564 (1937). In the Advisory Committee note to
Rule 801(d), the Reporter used the Strahorn article as his first citation.
167. John S. Strahorn, A Reconsideration of the Hearsay Rule and Admissions, 85 U. PA.
L. REV. 484, 487 (1937).
168. Park, supra note 13, at 509.
169. Strahorn, supra note 57, at 575.
170. Id. at 484. In addition to oath, presence in the courtroom and cross-examination,
these ―conditioning devices‖ also include sequestration, discovery and publicity. Id. Surprisingly,
despite the author‘s knowledge of Wigmore‘s views and the similarity between his ―hearsay rule
partially satisfied‖ and Wigmore‘s ―hearsay rule satisfied‖ category, Strahorn does not cite
Wigmore in his discussion of this category.
171. Id. at 494, 496.
172. Id. at 577.
173. Id. at 577-578.
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inapplicable category because, in his view, admissions were ― . . . offered
not to prove the truth of their content, but for some other relevant purpose .
. . . ‖174 He made a distinction between statements used as conduct (where
the hearsay rule was inapplicable) and statements used as narration (where
the hearsay rule applies). With admissions, he believed that the statements
themselves were relevant conduct, regardless of their truth or falsity. As
Strahorn put it:
The fact of the utterance by the party and his opponent‘s desire
to use it throw some light on the separate and noncontemporaneous conduct of the party-speaker, viz., his conduct
of the affair on which the instant case hinges. The justification
for using admissions, as for circumstantial utterances generally,
is the relation between the utterance and the other relevant
conduct of the speaker.175
Strahorn then tied this approach to the view Wigmore expressed in his
first edition and to the analogy to prior inconsistent statements:176 ―Just as a
prior inconsistent statement of a witness is admissible [for impeachment]
without reference to whether it is the present or the previous statement
which is false, so it is that the admissions comes in equally soon whether it,
standing alone, be true or false.‖177 In such a case, ―there is no concern for
their trustworthiness;‖178 therefore, the hearsay rule is inapplicable. Though
never using the term not hearsay to describe admissions, Strahorn placed
them in his ―hearsay rule inapplicable‖ category because he believed that
they were not hearsay in the traditional sense of that term.
Dean Charles McCormick was an evidence luminary of the rank of
Wigmore and Morgan.179 He was one of the main drafters of the Uniform
Rules of Evidence, and his 1954 Handbook on Evidence was the first major
Evidence treatise since the publication of Wigmore‘s third edition in

174. Id. at 488
175. Strahorn, supra note 158, at 572-73.
176. Strahorn described Wigmore‘s position as a ―modified‖ one, but this characterization
seems inaccurate. Strahorn emphasized only the inconsistency/self-contradiction strand of
Wigmore‘s writing on prior statements and quoted from the 1935 edition of his Code of Evidence
and his Student Textbook on Evidence (1935). Id. at 572, n.49. But the 1940 edition of the
Wigmore treatise repeats the language of the 1923 treatise, thus strongly suggesting that Wigmore
did not ―modify‖ but rather retained his dualistic view of admissions.
177. Id. at 573.
178. Id.
179. When Wigmore was forced to retire in 1934, he recruited McCormick, then Dean at
the North Carolina, to teach evidence at Northwestern, where he stayed until he returned to the
University of Texas Law School as dean in 1940. Roy R. Ray, McCormick’s Contributions to the
Law of Evidence, 40 TEX. L. REV. 185, 187 (1961).
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1940.180 In his handbook, McCormick summarized the views of different
scholars on the classification of admissions. He identified Wigmore‘s
initial (―hearsay rule inapplicable) and revised (―hearsay rule satisfied‖)
positions, as well as Morgan‘s (hearsay exception) and Strahorn‘s (hearsay
rule inapplicable) views.181 He also divided admissions into two different
types, recognizing both ―express admissions‖ (by which he meant a party‘s
oral or written statements) and admissions by conduct (the acts of a party
such as fleeing the scene of a crime or refusing to call a witness or produce
evidence.)182
After concluding his presentation of the different positions of the
writers, McCormick wrote ―The present writer finds Morgan‘s
classification of admissions as an exception to the hearsay rule, and his
explanation therefor, most convincing as to express admissions and
Strahorn‘s theory of admissions as circumstantial evidence most
satisfactory as to admissions by conduct.‖183
McCormick thus agreed with Morgan that oral and written admissions
should be treated as hearsay and classified as a hearsay exception. For
admissions by conduct, he agreed with Strahorn (and the Uniform Rules
and both the proposed and enacted Rule 801(a)) that such ―non-assertive
conduct‖ should be excluded from the definition of statement and thus not
180. Charles T. McCormick, McCormick‘s Handbook of the Law of Evidence
(1954)[hereinafter, McCormick, HANDBOOK]. McCormick died in 1963, shortly before the
beginning of the drafting of the Federal Rules.
181. I have one quibble with McCormick‘s summary. After describing Strahorn‘s views,
he stated that ―the affinity between this [Strahorn‘s] view and Wigmore‘s is apparent.‖
Memorandum No. 19, supra note 107, at 89 (citing MCCORMICK, supra note 180, at 503). This
statement obscured the important fact that, in Strahorn‘s view, admissions are not hearsay because
they are not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, whereas in later Wigmore‘s view,
admissions were considered for their truth but were excluded from the hearsay rule because the
concern about cross-examination has been satisfied (causing him to place them in his ―hearsay
rule satisfied‖ category).
182. See id. at 525-547. Wigmore had originally made this distinction, using the terms
―express‖ and ―implied‖ admissions.
183. Id. at 503. Interestingly, when Professor (former Reporter) Cleary became editor of
the hornbook for the second edition in 1972, he deleted this concluding paragraph. Instead, he
inserted a new paragraph, which stated:
On balance, the most satisfactory justification of the admissibility of admissions is
that they are the product of the adversary system, sharing, though on a lower and
non-conclusive level, the characteristics of admissions in pleadings or stipulations.
This view has the added advantage of avoiding the need to find with respect to
admissions the circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness which traditionally
characterize hearsay exceptions; admissions are simply classed as non-hearsay.
MCCORMICK‘S HANDBOOK, supra note 180, at 629. Professor Cleary then continued:
―Nevertheless, the usual practice is to regard admissions as an exception to the hearsay rule, and
as a matter of convenience the discussion of them is located at this point in this textbook.‖ Id.
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be regarded as hearsay.184
In Memorandum No. 19, the Reporter inaccurately implied that
McCormick might support his proposed treatment of admissions.
Concluding his discussion of Wigmore, Morgan, Strahorn, and McCormick,
the Reporter stated: ―McCormick took a position straddling Morgan and
Strahorn.‖185 This statement was literally true but terribly misleading. On
the critical issue of how to classify the most common type of admissions—
verbal or ―express admissions‖—McCormick came down squarely on the
side of treating admissions as hearsay and then as a hearsay exception. Far
from a straddle, it was a clear vote for classifying admissions as a hearsay
exception, not as not hearsay.
In addition to the Reporter‘s misleading discussion of the authorities,
he also failed to mention or discuss the Model Code, the Uniform Rules, or
the California Code, each of which, as we have seen, treated admissions as
hearsay with a separate exception. This omission contributed to the failure
to present and evaluate other alternatives for classifying admissions.
The Reporter‘s discussion of the classification issues for prior
statements was better than for admissions, but was still incomplete and
flawed. It was incomplete because it did not mention McCormick‘s famous
article, at the end of which he drafted a model statute that treated prior
statements as a hearsay exception.186 Then, while his observation about
prior statements—that the ―conditions for giving testimony are satisfied‖—
as correct, his next statement that ―logic dictates a classification as nonhearsay‖187 does not necessarily follow. The classification should be
determined by practical reason and experience, not by ―logic‖ (by which he
presumably meant deductive, syllogistic reasoning). Practical reason and
experience, not logic, establish the definitions and categories for evidence
law (indeed, as we have known at least since Holmes, 188 for all law).
―Logic‖ then operates somewhat mechanistically to place the objects (in our
case, the out-of-court statements offered for their truth) into the correct
categories.
Our current definition of hearsay as an out-of-court statement offered
for its truth is the product of practical reason and experience. In light of
this definition, it logically follows that a prior out-of-court statement
offered for its truth is hearsay. If we had a different hearsay definition—
184. Id.
185. Memorandum No.19, supra note 107, at 89.
186. McCormick, supra note 19.
187. Memorandum No. 19, supra note 107, at 70.
188. ―The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.‖ Oliver Wendall
Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 1 (1881).
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say, ―Hearsay is a statement by a person who is not a witness in the current
trial‖—then we would logically have a different result, and prior statements
of witnesses would ―logically‖ not be hearsay.189
Given the fact that prior statements of witnesses are hearsay under the
current definition, two subsequent policy questions arise: (1) the whether
question—whether, even though hearsay, prior statements should be
admitted as substantive evidence—and (2) the how question: if so, should
this be accomplished by creating a hearsay exception or by creating, either
implicitly or explicitly, a new classification of ―not hearsay.‖ The answers
to these questions should be and are based on practical reason and
experience. As the Reporter himself recognized, when discussing which
prior statements to include and exclude from Rule 801(d), ―[t]he judgment
is one more of experience than logic.‖190
IV. RULE 801(d) IN PRACTICE
Rule 801(d), while poorly written, has not caused significant problems
for lawyers and judges, because they have largely ignored the ―not hearsay‖
terminology and instead have used other, more useful and descriptive
words. This adaptive practice has been true in the courtroom and in most
reported cases, treatises and law school casebooks.
The Supreme Court has decided four cases involving Rule 801(d). In
those cases, the Court has used the terms ―exemption,‖191 ―exception,‖192

189. Of course this alternative definition is not and never has been the legal definition of
hearsay. The fact that the declarant is a witness goes to concerns about cross-examination, oath,
and demeanor that are policy issues that underlie the hearsay definition, but have not been made a
part of that definition.
190. FED. R. EVID. 801(d) advisory committee‘s note. The Reporter wrote this in
explaining whether he should follow the Model Code and Uniform Rules and allow all prior
statements to be admitted as substantive evidence, or follow California and exclude some. It of
course echoes Holmes‘ famous statement quoted supra note 188.
The Reporter also relied on practical reason in deciding how to classify depositions and former
testimony, both of which Wigmore had placed it in his ―hearsay rule satisfied‖ category. Drawing
on (although not citing) McCormick, the Reporter wrote, ―It is believed that the thinking of the
profession generally does not put depositions in the category of hearsay . . . [o]n the other hand, a
lawyer seeking to explore the admissibility of former testimony . . . would probably turn to
hearsay as the appropriate classification.‖ Memorandum No. 19, supra. note 107, at 84; See
McCormick, HANDBOOK, supra note 180, at 480 (―it follows the usage most familiar to the
profession . . . . ‖) Using ―the thinking of the profession‖ as a criteria is an excellent example of
practical reason in this context.
191. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986). While the opinion uses the term
―exemption‖ in several places, it states it most clearly in footnote 12: ―Federal Rule of Evidence
801 characterizes out-of-court statements by co-conspirators as exemptions from, rather than
exceptions to, the hearsay rule. Whether such statements are termed exemptions or exceptions, the
same Confrontation Clause principles apply.‖ Id. at 398 n.12.
192. Bourjailly v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987). The Court uses the phrase ―co-

Stonefield 6-13-11 (Do Not Delete)

52

FEDERAL COURTS LAW REVIEW

6/13/2011 9:38 AM

[Vol. 5

and ―exclusion‖193 more frequently than ―not hearsay.‖ The proposed
Advisory Committee Note for the stylistic revisions to the current Federal
Rules refers to the ―hearsay exclusion‖ in Rule 801(d).194 Lower court
cases regularly used similar terminology.195
Most treatises are similarly eclectic and relaxed with their
terminology. Professors Saltzburg, Martin, and Capra tell us that: ―The
Federal Rule provides for exemptions rather than exceptions‖ and that the
fact ―that the Federal Rules choose the redefinition approach, rather than the
approach of creating exceptions, is of no great moment.‖ 196 Law school
casebooks provide similar treatment.197 The reason for this relaxed
eclecticism is simple; ―There is no practical difference between an
exception to the hearsay rule and an exemption from that rule. If a
statement fits either an exemption or an exception, it is not excluded by the
hearsay rule, and it can be considered as substantive evidence if it is not
excluded by any other rule (e.g. Rule 403).‖198
Thirty-five years of experience have shown that Rule 801(d) can work
without creating a crisis or even serious problems. This does not mean,
conspirator exception‖ and ―exception‖ four times in the opinion. Justice Blackmun‘s dissent
uses the phrase ―co-conspirator exemption‖ ten times.
193. United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988).
194. Memorandum from Advisory Comm. On Evidence Rules to the Honorable Lee H.
Rosenthal, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 10, 2010) (available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/EV05-2010.pdf).
195. See, e.g., United States v. Brockenborrugh, 575 F.3d 726, 733 (D.C. Cir. 2009);
United States v. DiSantis, 565 F.3d 354, 360 (7th Cir 2009) (for ―exemption); United States v.
Holden, 557 F.3d 698, 706 (6th Cir. 2009); Bennett v. Saint-Gobain Corp., 507 F.3d 23, 28 (1st
Cir. 2007) (for ―exclusion‖); United States v. Ayala, 601 F.3d 256, 268-69 (4th Cir. 2010); United
Staes v. Mitchell, 596 F.3d 18, 22-23 (1st Cir. 2010) (for ―exception‖).
196. 4 SALTZBURG ET AL, supra note 6, at 801-41. A recent hornbook says: ―Most courts
and commentators refer to these two classes of evidence . . . as hearsay exemptions or exclusions.
In this text, we will denote these special classes with the term ‗exemptions‘ or, occasionally, with
the phrases ‗statutory nonhearsay‘ or ‗definitional nonhearsay‘‖ Lilly, Et Al, supra note 2, at 16061. Professor Michael Graham uses the term ―exemption‖ and writes that ―[u]se of the term
‗exemption‘ to appy to prior statements . . . as well as admissions . . . helps to relieve the
confusion.‖ 30B MICHAEL GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: 28, n.19 (Interim ed.
2006). Professors Mueller and Kirkpatrick note that ―Rule 801(d)(2)(A) creates what amounts to
an exception for personal or individual statements made by a party and offered against him‖ and
that ―it is more convenient to refer to admissions doctrine as a hearsay exception.‖ MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 3, at 360-61.
197. See, e.g., RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., EVIDENCE: TEXT, CASES AND PROBLEMS 452
(4th ed. 2006) (stating that there are eight exemptions and twenty-nine exceptions and that ―there
is no difference‖); RICHARD O. LEMPERT ET AL. A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 534 (4th
ed. 2000) (treats them as exceptions); DENNIS D. PRATER ET AL., EVIDENCE: THE OBJECTION
METHOD 591 (3rd. 2007) (uses exemption and exclusion interchangeably); PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN,
ET AL., EVIDENCE: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS (3rd ed. 2006) (treats them as
exemptions); GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 392-93 (2d ed. 2002) (treats them as exceptions).
198. 4 SALTZBURG ET. AL., supra note 6, at 801-27.
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however, that it is the best rule or that its confusing ―not hearsay‖
terminology is the best terminology. Some states have recognized the
shortcomings of Rule 801(d) and have adopted innovative alternative
approaches. I look at those approaches in the following section, before
concluding in Section VI with an evaluation of several different approaches
and the prospects for amending the rule.
V.

RULE 801(d) AND THE ―NOT HEARSAY‖ CLASSIFICATION IN THE
STATES

Early on, even before the final enactment of the Federal Rules, states
began to adopt some version of the Federal Rules as their state evidence
code. Acting first, Nevada adopted the Preliminary Draft in 1971.199 New
Mexico and Wisconsin modeled their new rules on the proposed rules
promulgated by the Supreme Court in 1972.200 Several other states jumped
on the bandwagon soon after Congress enacted the federal statute, as did the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL), which stated, when it discarded the 1954 Uniform Rules in
1974 and adopted the federal rules as the new Uniform Rules: ―We believe
uniformity in the Law of Evidence is desirable. To conform state and
federal practice is to require a lawyer to learn one set of rules instead of
two. The lawyer will better serve the public in whichever of these forums he
may be litigating.‖201 The state adoptions continued apace and as of August
2010, forty-four states have adopted some version of the Federal Rules.202

199. Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51.035 (West 2006).
200. New Mexico amended its rules in 1976 to conform to the rules that Congress
enacted. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 11-801 (2003); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 908.01 (West 2009).
201. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Prefatory Note to
UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 915 (1974). The 1974 Uniform Rules did not include Rule
801(d)(1)(C) (prior statements of identification), because it was adopted before Congress
reinstated that provision.
202. The states are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West
Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. The citations are available at BARBARA E. BERGMAN &
NANCY HOLLAND, 6 WHARTON‘S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE §66, 283-72 (15th ed. 1998) (2009-2010
supp.). Illinois adopted its rules on September 27, 2010, effective January 1, 2011. Christopher
Bonjean, Supreme Court Approves Illinois Rules of Evidence (Sept. 27, 2010), available at
http://www.illinoislawyernow.com/2010/09/27/supreme-court-approves-illinois-rules-ofevidence/ (last visited May 5, 2011). I included both Connecticut and Massachusetts as adopting
jurisdictions, although each state was clear that it was adopting only the general organization and
numbering system of the federal rules and was simply restating its existing evidence rules in the
federal format. For Connecticut, see CONN. EVI. CODE § 1.2 (2009) (one of ―[t]he purposes of the
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Especially in light of the experience with the Model Code and the Uniform
Rules, this record of state adoptions is a remarkable achievement.
While uniformity has been the primary goal of the state adoptions, no
jurisdiction adopted the federal rules verbatim, and most have modified
them in two or more ways.203 When making these modifications, states
have decided that the advantages of a customized state rule in expressing or
protecting an important state interest outweighed the disadvantages of nonuniform language. In such instances, the ―quality‖ of a particular provision
matters more than uniformity.204 As a result, states have added considerable
variety into the putatively uniform rules.
The non-adoption of Rule 801(d) has been part of that variety. Nine of
the adopting states have rejected Rule 801(d) either in whole or in part and
have instead classified admissions or prior statements, or both, as hearsay
exceptions.205 Adopting the federal rules in 1979, Florida rejected Rule
801(d) and instead classified admissions as a Rule 803 exception and placed
prior statements as an exclusion in the definition section—as was done in
the first two drafts of the federal rules.206 When North Carolina adopted the
[c]ode [is] to adopt Connecticut case law regarding rules of evidence as rules of court . . . ‖ in a
―readily accessible body of rules to which the legal profession conveniently may refer‖ and not to
adopt ―the Federal Rules of Evidence or cases interpreting those rules.‖ CONN. EVID. CODE 1-2(a)
cmt. In a 2008 case, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that the evidence rules in the Code of
Evidence were binding on the Superior Court judges but that the appellate courts ―retain the
authority to develop and change the rules of evidence through case-by-case common-law
adjudication.‖ State v. DeJesus, 953 A.2d 45, 90-91 (Conn. 2008), aff’d, 288 Conn. 418 (Conn.
2008). For Massachusetts, see SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE LAW Introduction, MASSACHUSETTS GUIDE TO EVIDENCE (2010)
(These are ―not rules, but rather . . . a guide to evidence based on the law as it exists today . . . .
Ultimately, the law of evidence in Massachusetts is what is contained in the authoritative
decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court and of the Appeals Court, and the statutes duly enacted by
the Legislature.‖).
203. See L. Kinvin Wroth, The Federal Rules of Evidence in the States: A Ten-Year
Perspective, 30 VILL. L. REV. 1315 (1985); Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., State Adaptation of the
Federal Rules: The Pros and Cons, 43 OKLA. L. REV. 293, 310 (1990).
204. See. e.g., Neil P. Cohen, A Meta-Analysis of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence, 57
TENN. L. REV. 30, 30 (1989) (―The many areas where the Tennessee rules improve on federal
language and content are also impressive. The Commission resisted the temptation to adopt the
Federal Rules of Evidence in toto. Rather, the Commission did a careful analysis of each rule and
made some courageous changes in the federal approach.‖).
205. In alphabetical order, the nine states that adopted the federal rules but have not
followed Rule 801(d) are: Connecticut; CONN. EVI. CODe § 8.5(1) (2009), Florida; FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 90.803(18) (West 2009), Hawaii; HAW. REV. STAT. § 626-1 (1988), Kentucky; 2009 KY.
REV. STAT. Adv. Legis. Serv. 77 (LexisNexis), Maryland; MD. ANN. CODE art. 5, § 802.1 (2006);
New Jersey; N.J. R. EVID. § 803 (2005), North Carolina; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 (2009),
Pennsylvania; PA.R.E. 803 (1998), and Tennessee; TENN. CODE ANN. § 803 (2007).
206. Florida also created three different exceptions for former testimony: one for former
testimony in a prior civil trial with the same parties and issues, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(22)
(West 2009), and one for former testimony in civil trials and one for former testimony in criminal
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federal rules in 1984, it treated admissions as a hearsay exception but did
not permit any substantive use of any prior statements.207 Tennessee treated
admissions as a hearsay exception and also created an exception for
statements of prior identification and, in accordance with its case law, not
for prior inconsistent or consistent statements.208 Kentucky classified both
admissions and prior statements as hearsay exceptions,209 as did New
Jersey, which had adopted the Uniform Rules in 1967 and then, in 1993,
amended its rules to conform to the numbering system of the Federal Rules
of Evidence. 210
Four jurisdictions in particular—Hawaii, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and
Connecticut—have developed innovative approaches to the classification of
admissions and prior statements, with Hawaii leading the way. Guided by
the Reporter for the Hawaii Rules of Evidence, Professor Addison Bowman
decided to maintain the common law approach of treating admissions and
prior statements as hearsay exceptions and then to create separate declarantbased exceptions to highlight their distinctiveness for Hawaii‘s rules. It
created a new category, Rule 803(a), exclusively for admissions and then
placed all the ―Rule 803‖ exceptions as sub-sections in a new Rule 803(b)
category.211211It also created a new Rule 802.1 for statements by a witness
and, following the California Evidence Code, included the exception for
past-recorded recollections in the new category.212 The Hawaii model is
one variation of what I call the ―four categories‖ approach, with categories
based on whether the declarant is a witness, a party-opponent, unavailable,
or where their availability is immaterial.
In 1986, Maryland followed the Hawaii model, using identical
language.212 Pennsylvania (in 1992)213 and Connecticut (in 1999)214 each
trials. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.804(2)(a) (West 2009) is an exception inspired by Wigmore‘s
―hearsay rule satisfied‖ treatment of former testimony.
207. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 801 (West 2009).
208. TENN. CODE ANN. § 803-1-1 (2007); See also Cohen, supra note 204.
209. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 77 (LexisNexis 2009).
210. See N.J. R EVID. (1967) and N.J. R. EVID. 803 (1993).
211. HAW. REV. STAT. § 626-1.803(a) (2007); In addition to the admissions categories of
the federal rules, the Hawaii rule also includes several sub-categories drawn from the California
Evidence Code. 212 HAW. REV. STAT. § 626-1.802.1 (2007).
212. MD. R. EVID. Rule 5-802.1, 5-803. Justice Chasanow supported the state adoption of
the rules but, in a separate opinion, objected to the fact that Maryland modified ―over 80% of the
Federal Rules‖ in its adoption.‖ Order Adopting New Title 5, Rules of Evidence, 333 Md.
XXXV, XXXIX (1993) (Chasnow, J. dissenting). Interestingly, he specifically objected to Rule
803(a): ―In an unnecessary attempt to imply that Wigmore, the other evidence scholars, and the
Federal Rules of Evidence were in error when they classified admissions as non-hearsay, the
Rules Committee . . . classified them as hearsay, but an exception to the hearsay rule. This
change, like so many others, is unnecessary and a potential source of confusion and
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created a new category for prior statements, but treated admissions as a
general hearsay exception where the availability of the declarant was
immaterial.215
There were six states that, as of October, 2010, had not adopted the
Federal Rules of Evidence, and all six treat admissions and prior statements
as hearsay exceptions. Two of them already had their own state evidence
codes prior to the enactment of the federal rules and retained those codes:
California, with the California Evidence Code, and Kansas, as the first
adopter of the original Uniform Rules. The four remaining non-adopting
states—Georgia, Missouri, New York, and Virginia—have no overall
evidence codes and instead rely for their evidence law on a mix of case law,
statutes, and court rules. 216 Each jurisdiction follows the traditional
common law approach of classifying admissions and prior statements as
hearsay exceptions.217
My final comment on state practices concerns the reasons given—or,
more often, not given—for adopting or not adopting Rule 801(d). In only
one of the thirty-four jurisdictions that adopted Rule 801(d), Texas, is there
any record of reasons for selecting Rule 801(d).218 One might expect for at

misinterpretation.‖ Id. at XLIV-XLV. He also objected to the changes in prior statements. Id.
213. PA. R. EVID. 803.
214. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-3 (2000).
215. Connecticut‘s category for witnesses is called ―Declarant Must Be Available‖ CONN.
EVID. CODE §805 (2000); Pennsylvania‘s is ―Testimony of Declarant Necessary‖ PA.R.E. 803.1
(1998). Pennsylvania (but not Connecticut) included Past Recollection Recorded in the ―declarant
is a witness‖ category. Id.
216. Georgia has an evidence code—the Code of 1863. However, because of the age of
the code, Georgia‘s evidence law today is the old code, newer statutes and common law. PAUL S.
MILICH, THE PROPOSED NEW GEORGIA RULES OF EVIDENCE: A BRIEF OVERVIEW (2010),
available at http://www.gabar.org/public/pdf/news/proposed_new_evidence_rules_milich.pdf.
The proposed new rules treat admissions as a hearsay exception but prior statements as not
hearsay.
GA. R. EVID. 801(d)(1), (2) (proposed June 6, 2005), available at
http://www.gabar.org/public/pdf/news/proposed_new_evidence_rules.pdf.
217. Lumpkin v. Deventer N.Am., Inc., 672 S.E.2d 405, 409 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008)
(admission by agent is admissible under exception to rule against hearsay); but see Carroll v.
State, 408 S.E.2d 412 (1991) (prior statements are not hearsay because ―concerns of the rule
against hearsay are satisfied when the witness . . . is present at trial, under oath, and subject to
cross-examination.‖); Gamble v. Browning, 277 S.W.3d 723, 729 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (Excerpt
of videotape in which defendant admitted to setting up plaintiff in a burglary was an admission by
a party opponent and, thus, was admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule in a malicious
prosecution action.); Albert v. Denise, 181 A.D.2d 732, 732 (N.Y App. Div. 1992) (Statement that
mother had used cocaine in his presence and had attempted to have him take cocaine was
admissible under hearsay exception for prior statements); Parker v. Commonwealth, 587 S.E. 2d
749, 751-52 (Va. Ct. App. 2003) (prior statements admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule).
218. The Texas Commentary, written by Professor Olin Guy Wellborn as Reporter, gave a
short statement of reasons: ―Even though these statements inform would fit the hearsay definition,
they are not excluded as hearsay because they do not invoke all the policies behind the hearsay
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least one jurisdiction to discuss the possible problems of adding a new,
contradictory meaning for the not hearsay term; however, there have been
none.219 The imprimatur of the federal rules and the desire for uniformity
have been sufficient in themselves.
Two of the nine states that rejected Rule 801(d) did give reasons for
their action—terse and conclusive, but reasons nonetheless.
The
Pennsylvania Advisory Committee Notes stated:
The Pennsylvania rules, like the common law, call an admission
by a party-opponent an exception to the hearsay rule. The
Pennsylvania rules, therefore, place admissions by a party
opponent in Pa.R.E. 803 with other exceptions to the hearsay
rule in which the availability of the declarant is immaterial. The
difference between the federal and Pennsylvania formulations is
organizational. It has no substantive effect.220
And ―Subsection (a) is similar to F.R.E. 801(d)(1)(A), except that the
Pennsylvania rule classifies those kinds of inconsistent statements that are
described therein as exceptions to the hearsay rule, not exceptions to the
definition of hearsay.‖221
The Hawaii comments said that admissions were treated ―as
exceptions to the hearsay rule rather than as non-hearsay.‖222 The
comments also pointed out that admissions were placed in Rule 803, where
the availability of the declarant was immaterial and then in a separate
exception, (a), with the other Rule 803 exceptions placed in a sub-section
(b), because ―[t]he rationales for paragraphs (a) and (b) of this rule differ
markedly . . . . ‖223
For prior statements, placed in a new Rule 802.1, the comment noted

rule.‖ Olin Guy Welborn III, Article VII Hearsay: Commentary, 20 HOUS. L. REV. 477, 494
(1983). Interestingly, several states noted, in their state Advisory Committee Notes, that Rule
801(d) marked a departure from the state tradition of treating admissions (and sometimes prior
statements) as hearsay exceptions. See the Advisory Committee Notes or comments to Rule
801(d) for Alabama, Mississippi, Vermont, and Ohio. Showing some ambivalence about its
adoption, Alabama‘s Advisory Committee says, ―These statements [prior statements in Rule
801(d)(1)] . . . are declared arbitrarily not to be hearsay.‖ AL. R. EVID. 803 advisory committe‘s
note (emphasis supplied).
219. One might have especially expected some commentary from Utah, which adopted
the original Uniform Rules in 1971 and then switched to the federal rules in 1983. Ronald N.
Boyce & Edward L. Kimball, Utah Rules of Evidence 1983—Part III, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 717,
718 (1995).
220. PA. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee‘s note.
221. PA. R. EVID. 803.1 advisory committee‘s note.
222. HAW. REV. STAT. § 626-1 cmt. (2010).
223. Id. at Rule 803(a).
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that ―[t]his rule [a]ffects a reorganization of certain of the hearsay
provisions found in Article VIII of the federal rules. The formulation
follows generally the scheme of Cal. Evid. Code in treating all appropriate
prior witness statements in a single rule.‖224
As has been the case from the time of the Model Code in 1942 to
today, the classification of admissions and prior statements has not been the
subject of expansive discourse or commentary by the codifiers.
VI. AN EVALUATION OF SIX ALTERNATIVES AND A SUGGESTED
AMENDMENT
This section evaluates six different approaches to classifying
admissions and prior statements and selects what I call the ―four categories‖
approach as the best solution. This approach creates separate categories for
hearsay exceptions, each based on the status of the hearsay declarant. There
would be a category for (1) the declarant as a party—for admissions; (2) the
declarant as a witness—for prior statements; (3) when the availability of the
declarant is immaterial; and (4) when the declarant must be unavailable.
The section also discusses the several different ways that an amending
body—state or federal—might implement the preferred approach.225
Before beginning the evaluation, it is useful to remember what
McCormick said about the definition of hearsay and apply it to our
problem: ―Too much should not be expected of a definition.‖226 This
wisdom reminds us that it is unreasonable to expect any classification of
admissions and prior statements to resolve all the theoretical and practical
issues involved with these kinds of statements. If classified as ―not
hearsay‖ as in Rule 801(d), there is confusion over both the term‘s meaning
and the risk of inconsistent use. If classified as hearsay and an exception,
there may be a reduced emphasis on the distinctiveness of admissions and
prior statements, and since we are not writing on a blank slate, the costs of
change after thirty-five years of usage.
On the other hand, neither should we expect too little of a
224. Id. at Rule 802.1.
225. There is also a fifth category for hearsay exceptions, which is the residual exception
currently represented by Rule 807. FED. R. EVID. 807. If the residual category represented by
Rule 807 were included in the count, the recommendation would be for a ―five categories‖
approach.
226. McCormick, supra note 180, at 459. He then went on to say that a definition ―cannot
furnish answers to all the complex problems of an extensive field (such as hearsay) in a sentence.
The most it can accomplish is to furnish a helpful starting-point for discussion of the problems,
and a memory-aid in recalling some of the solutions. But if the definition is to remain brief and
understandable, it will necessarily distort some parts of the picture. Simplification is
falsification.‖ Id.
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classification. When used as part of a code of rules, we have every reason
to demand that the classification satisfy the basic criteria of rule drafting:
clarity and consistency. These are the standards of the Guidelines for
Drafting and Editing the Court Rules and the leading works on drafting.227
They are also consistent with the goals that the Reporter himself expressed
at the beginning of the drafting process.228 In addition to clarity and
consistency, I would also add a third criterion, education: the ability of the
classification to educate users as to the distinctiveness of admissions and
prior statements and their differences from the out-of-court statements
covered by the other hearsay exceptions.229
The six alternatives to evaluate under these criteria are:
1) The Federal Rule approach, with Rule 801(d) and the ―not hearsay‖
terminology;
2) The First and Second Draft approach, excluding admissions and
prior statements from the definition of hearsay, Rule 801(c);
3) The predecessor code approach, treating admissions and prior
statements as one of a list of hearsay exceptions;
4) The ―three categories‖ approach adopted by Connecticut and
Pennsylvania;
5) The ―four categories‖ approach that I recommend;230 and

227. See generally BRYAN A. GARNER, GUIDELINES FOR DRAFTING AND EDITING THE
COURT RULES (5th ed. 2009): See also, e.g., REED DICKERSON, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL
DRAFTING (2d ed. 1986), LAWRENCE E. FILSON AND SANDRA L. STROKOFF, THE LEGISLATIVE
DRAFTER‘S DESK REFERENCE (2d ed. 2008).
228. As noted in Section III, at the second meeting of the Advisory Committee in
October, 1965, the Reporter told the members that ―words should be used in their ordinary
meaning whenever possible‖ and that he was drafting the rules ―to be as usable and accessible as
possible.‖ United States Courts, Minutes of Rules Committee Meetings, supra note 108, at 3.
229. These criteria for evaluating the various alternatives are different from and narrower
than the goals of the initial codification effort; which also included uniformity, reform, and
accessibility. The selection of one or another alternative approach to the treatment of admissions
and prior statements will have no impact on reform—only a possible short-term impact on
uniformity—and should help accessibility.
230. In addition to having four categories based on the status of the declarant, my
preferred approach also follows the lead of California and Hawaii and includes past recollection
recorded exception in the declarant-as-a-witness category (and moves it from its present
placement in Rule 803(5)).
The reason for this proposed relocation is clear. A past recorded recollection is a prior
statement of a witness. Under the terms of the exception, the declarant of the past recorded
recollection must appear as a witness in court and testify as to the foundational requirements of
the exception. California, Hawaii, and Maryland place past recorded recollections within the
exception for prior statements. The Reporter‘s reason for not placing it with the other prior
statements and classifying it instead as a Rule 803 exception was weak. He did not place it with
the prior statements provision because Rule 801(d)(1) ―requires that declarant be ‗subject to crossexamination,‘ as to which the impaired memory aspect of the exception raises doubts.‖ FED. R.
EVID. 803(5) advisory committee‘s note (interestingly, the quoted language was not in the original
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6) A ―four categories‖ approach where the categories for admissions
and prior statements are labeled ―exemptions‖ or ―exclusions‖ rather
than ―exceptions.‖
Rule 801(d) scores poorly on clarity and consistency. Under Rule
801(d)(1), a prior inconsistent statement is called not hearsay if offered to
impeach and ―not hearsay‖ if offered substantively. An admission is both
hearsay under Rule 801(c) and ―not hearsay‖ under Rule 801(d)(2). It is
unclear and confusing to have the same term, ―not hearsay,‖ used in an
inconsistent manner.
The First and Second Draft approach has the same problem.
Excluding admissions and prior statements from the hearsay definition does
not make them disappear from the courtroom. Lawyers still offer the
statements at trials, opponents still object, and lawyers and judges continue
to need a term to describe them. If they are not hearsay, what are they?
The default term for evidence that is not hearsay is ―not hearsay,‖ which
creates inconsistency with the traditional meaning of not hearsay.
The final four alternatives score much better on clarity and
consistency. They follow the traditional approach, using the term ―not
hearsay‖ only to describe statements not offered for their truth and
reserving the term ―hearsay exception‖ for statements offered for their truth,
that we nevertheless wish to admit into evidence. This usage is clear and
consistent.
With regards to the education criterion, Rule 801(d) educates
somewhat, but in an indirect and opaque manner. Rather than highlighting
what admissions and prior statements are (statements by the declarant as a
party and as a witness), Rule 801(d) instead asserts that they are ―not
hearsay,‖ whereas they are hearsay under the definition of Rule 801(c).231
As such, it is more confusing than enlightening. Second, by combining
admissions and prior statements together in one rule, Rule 801(d) misses
the opportunity to educate on how these two types of statements differ from
each other and to remind judges and lawyers that the reasons for granting
their admissibility are very different. Prior statements are very reliable,
among the best of the admissible hearsay. Admissions are, doctrinally at
least, notably unreliable. Grouping them together is artificial and

ACN but was added in the third draft). While there may have been some doubt in 1967 about
whether a witness with an impaired memory was subject to cross-examination, that doubt was
removed by United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988), and the clear non-compliance with the
terms of Rule 803 and Rule 804 trump any possible concerns over a possible fit with Rule
801(d)(1).
231. Which is why Professors Lilly, Saltzburg, and Capra correctly called the Rule 801(d)
usage an ―oxymoron.‖ LILLY ET. AL., supra note 2, at 160.
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misleading. It did not make sense when Wigmore did it, first as ―hearsay
rule inapplicable‖ as self-contradiction and then as ―hearsay rule satisfied,‖
and it does not make sense in Rule 801(d).
The predecessor codes missed the opportunity to educate when they
placed admissions and prior statements in an undifferentiated list of hearsay
exceptions.
The ―three categories‖ approach educates as to the
distinctiveness of prior statements but fails to do so for admissions. Only
the fifth and sixth alternatives, with the ―four categories‖ approach, perform
the educational function optimally. By putting admissions and prior
statements in separate categories, the four categories approach emphasizes
their difference from each other and from the other hearsay exceptions. By
labeling the new categories correctly as ―Declarant is a Witness‖ and
―Declarant is a Party-Opponent,‖ it reinforces both the reason for their
distinctiveness and the rationales for their admissibility.232
The sixth and final alternative is a variation on the ―four categories‖
approach that labels the categories for declarant as a witness and declarant
as a party as exemptions or exclusions intead of exceptions. The use of
such a synonym would further emphasize the educational point that
admissions and prior statements are different from the other exceptions;
they are so different that we even use a different noun to describe them.
However, this seems like overkill. Creating separate exceptions is
sufficient to make the educational point. There is no need to introduce an
additional term with the same meaning, and there is a cost (yet another term
of art to remember) in doing so. In this instance, simpler is better.
The basic ―four categories‖ approach is superior in terms of clarity,
consistency, and education. What might an amendment embodying this
approach look like? Does an amended rule make sense at this time? This
article concludes by addressing these questions.
A. What might the “Four Categories” approach look like?
There are several ways to amend the Federal Rules of Evidence to

232. As another example of the ―there is no perfect solution‖ maxim, a ―four categories‖
amendment that would provide clarity, consistency, and educational value for admissions and
prior statements would at the same time render certain applications of Rule 806 either redundant
or puzzling. If prior statements becomes a hearsay exception, Rule 806‘s authorization of the
impeachment of the declarant-witness will be redundant, since a witness is already impeachable
qua witness. If admissions become a hearsay exception, Rule 806 would authorize a partyopponent to impeach his or her own statement. As Wigmore and Morgan noted long ago, this is
unnecessary, since the party obviously can take the stand if he or she wishes to do so. While such
authorization makes sense (as the language of Rule 806 makes clear) in the context of vicarious
admissions, it is does not with personal admissions.
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incorporate the ―four categories‖ approach. While those with greater
familiarity with the rules drafting and amending process will surely have
additional insights, I can begin the discussion by suggesting several types of
amendments, three that are minimalist and two that are more
thoroughgoing.233
One minimalist approach would retain the framework and specific rule
language of Rule 801(d) but would change the titles of the main rule and
the two sub-rules. Thus, the title of Rule 801(d) would change from
―Statements Which are not Hearsay‖ to ―Hearsay Exceptions.‖ The title of
Rule 801(d)(1) would become ―Declarant is a Witness‖ and Rule 801(d)(2)
would become ―Declarant is a Party-Opponent.‖ Additionally, Rule 803(5)
would move and become a new Rule 801(d)(1)(4). This approach has the
important advantage of being minimally disruptive to the other rules.
While it continues to group admissions and prior statements together and
thus loses the opportunity to educate as to their distinctiveness, it could
provide a different kind of future educational benefit. It might remind
readers twenty years from now—when they inquire as to why these two
exceptions are placed in Rule 801(d) and grouped together—of how
confusing the classification issue once was.
A second minimalist approach would follow the one used by several
states. Hawaii, Maryland, and Pennsylvania created a new category for
statements by witnesses and then simply shoehorned in the new category as
a new sub-section of an existing category: Rule 802.1 in Hawaii and
Maryland, and Rule 803.1 in Pennsylvania.234 While each of these states
then placed admissions into an exception within their Rule 803 category,
the amenders could simply create another new sub-section for admissions,
such as Rule 802.2 or 803.2. This approach is awkward and forced, and is
not recommended. A third minimalist approach—and the one that I
prefer—would delete Rule 801(d) and then create two new exceptions as

233. My thinking on possible amendments has benefited greatly from correspondence
with Professor Dan Capra, who has flagged a number of important issues and has made numerous
helpful suggestions. Any amendment to Rule 801(d) will require other conforming amendments.
Certain language of Rule 806—―a statement defined in Rule 801(d)(2)(C), (D), or (E)‖—should
be deleted. FED. R. EVID. 806. To the extent that the amendments would renumber Rule 803,
other rules that refer to certain hearsay exceptions by number (such as Rules 901(11) and (12)),
would need to be changed. It is also important to note that any renumbering will complicate
future electronic searches, although some renumbering provisions will be affected more than
others. Professor Capra discusses these issues in greater detail in his September 16, 2010,
memorandum to the Advisory Committee. See Memorandum to Advisory Committee from
Daniel Capra, supra note 14 (Sept. 16, 2010).
234. HAW. REV. STAT. § 626-1 (1980); MD. R. EVID. 5-802.1; PA. R.EVID.. 803.1.
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Rules 808 and 809. 235 The deletion of Rule 801(d) would strengthen and
clarify Rule 801 by making it a rule focused exclusively on the definition of
hearsay. Creating new exceptions as Rules 808 and 809 would take
advantage of the fact that the highest numbered rule in Article VIII of the
Federal Rules of Evidence is currently Rule 807. The new Rule 808 would
be titled ―Declarant is a Witness,‖ and would be identical to the current
Rule 801(d)(1). Rule 809 would be titled ―Declarant as a Party-Opponent‖
and would be identical to the current Rule 801(D)(2). This approach
creates separate exceptions for prior statements and admissions, and does so
without disrupting the numbering scheme for the other hearsay exceptions.
It thus follows the approach used by the Advisory Committee in its
treatment of the residual exception, with the deletion of two prior
exceptions (Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5)) and the transfer of the text into a
residual exception located in a new Rule 807.236 The location of the Rule
807, like that of the proposed Rules 808 and 809, has the disadvantage of
not being sequential with the other hearsay exceptions (which are located in
Rules 803 and 804). However, the Advisory Committee wanted a separate
category for the residual exception and presumably thought that the lack of
sequential ordering was less of a problem than the alternative, which would
have been to place the new residual exception as Rule 805 and the
renumber the current Rules 805 and 806 as Rules 806 and 807.
Renumbering other rules in order to make room for a new rule is a serious
disadvantage, as we will see in the discussion of the more thorough
approach to amending Rule 801(d). It also ―cleans up‖ Rule 801, leaving it
as an exclusively definitional rule.
The more thoroughgoing approach would be to create the two new
categories in renumbered sections of Article VIII. One version of this
approach might have Rule 801(d)(1) become the new Rule 803 and Rule
801(d)(2) the new Rule 804. The hearsay exceptions would then be:
803 Declarant is a Witness – Prior Statements237
804 Declarant is a Party-Opponent – Statements of PartyOpponents238
805 Availability of Declarant Immaterial239

235. Professor Capra suggested this alternative for consideration. He developed it after he
submitted his September 16, 2010 memorandum, and thus it was not included in the alternatives
discussed in that memorandum. See Capra, supra note 14.
236. See FED. R. EVID. 807 advisory committee‘s note.
237. This would include the language from the current Rule 801(d)(1) as well as the
current Rule 803(5), which would be a new Rule 803(4).
238. This would include the language from the current Rule 801(d)(2).
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806 Declarant Unavailable
In addition to creating separate exceptions for prior statements and
admissions, this approach has the advantage of keeping the hearsay
exceptions together in a sequentially numbered group. However, the
extensive renumbering would require significant retraining and would also
seriously complicate future electronic searches. My sense is that the costs
of renumbering the rules exceed the benefits of sequential numbering.
Another version might create the new category only for declarant as a
witness, and for admissions, following Hawaii and Maryland by placing it
in a new Rule 803(a) category and moving the current Rule 803 exceptions
to a newly-created Rule 803(b) category. This version has the advantage of
emphasizing the similarity that admissions have with the other Rule 803
exceptions (the availability of the declarant is indeed immaterial), but it
runs the risk of underemphasizing the differences.
B. Amending the Federal Rules of Evidence
Any proposed amendment (whether minimalist or thoroughgoing)
must satisfy the standards governing the amendment process. The
amendment of the Federal Rules of Evidence follows the same well-defined
Rules Enabling Act process as the other federal court rules.240 The statutory
authority for the amendment process is vested with the Standing Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, commonly known as the ―Standing Committee,‖ which has
delegated the initial rule-amending authority to one of five advisory
committees—in the case of evidence, the Advisory Committee on Evidence
Rules.241

239. Rule 803(5) would be deleted and its language transferred to the new Rule 803(4).
240. James C. Duff, The Rulemaking Process: A Summary for the Bench and Bar
(October 2010), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/RulemakingProcess/SummaryBen
chBar.aspx; see also 28 U.S.C. §2073(b). This process governs amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, and the Federal Bankruptcy Rules, as well as the Federal Rules of Evidence. Of
course, Congress can also unilaterally amend the federal rules, as it did with Rule 412 and Rules
413-415.
241. Duff, supra note 240. The Advisory Committee begins the amending process by
studying an issue, then drafting an amendment and submitting it for public review and comment.
The Advisory Committee then presents its proposed amendment to the Standing Committee,
which reviews it, and if approved, presents the proposed amendment to the Judicial Conference.
If approved, the Judicial Conference then transmits the proposed amendment to the Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court then reviews and, if approved, promulgates the amendment by
forwarding it to Congress by May 1 of any given year. The amendment takes effect on December
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After being unceremoniously abolished soon after the enactment of
the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, the Advisory Committee on
Evidence Rules was reestablished in 1993.242 The Advisory Committee
soon thereafter announced its general philosophy for assessing proposed
amendments, a conservative approach that I discuss below.243 In addition to
dealing with its general amendments, the Advisory Committee has also
participated in the ongoing effort of the Judicial Conference to ―restyle‖ the
federal rules. This restyling project, started in the early 1990s with the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure244 and now reaching the Federal
Rules of Evidence, is designed ―to simplify, clarify and make more uniform
all of the federal rules of practice, procedure and evidence.‖245 The
Advisory Committee will thus entertain two types of amendments: general
amendments or restyling amendments.
One might think that an amendment to Rule 801(d) would work well
as a restyling amendment. The goal of the amendment is more stylistic than
substantive. It seeks to change only how we describe admissions and prior
statements (calling them hearsay exceptions instead of ―not hearsay‖), not
to change the amount and type of evidence admitted or excluded. However,
the Advisory Committee has established criteria for restyling amendments,
and the proposed amendment to Rule 801(d) does not meet those criteria.246
Restyling amendments can affect only style, not substance, and the
Advisory Committee has stated that a proposed change is substantive if:

1 of that year unless Congress takes action.
242. SUBCOMMITTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, Self-Study of Federal Judicial
Rulemaking: Report to the Committee on Rules of Practice, Procedure, and Evidence of the
Judicial Confernce of the United States, 168 F.R.D. 679, 686 (1995).
243. Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules, 156 F.R.D. 339, 484 (1994).
244. The Rules of Appellate Procedure were amended with an effective date of December
1, 1998. FED. R. APP. P. 1 advisory committee‘s note. The Rules of Criminal Procedure were
amended with an effective date of December 1, 2002. FED. R. CRIM. P. advisory committee‘s note.
The Rules of Civil Procedure were amended with an effective date of December 1, 2008. FED. R.
CIV. P. 1 advisory committee‘s note. See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED STYLE REVISION
OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 2 (2009) (released for public comment on Aug. 11, 2009).
245. See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED STYLE REVISION OF THE
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 2 (2009) (released for public comment on Aug. 11, 2009).
246. This discussion of the restyling criteria is primarily heuristic, not for practical effect
during the current restyling, which is nearly finalized. The restyling project began in 2007 Draft
amendments were published for public comment in August 2009, and the Advisory Committee
approved those amendments in April 2010 and sent them to the Standing Committee.
Memorandum from Robert L. Hinkle, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules to the
Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial
Conference
of
the
U.S.
1-6
(May
10,
2010),
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/EV05-2010.pdf.
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1. Under the existing practice in any circuit, it could lead to a
different result on a question of admissibility; or
2. Under the existing practice in any circuit, it could lead to a change
in the procedure by which an admissibility decision is made; or
3. It changes the structure of a rule or method of analysis in a manner
that fundamentally changes how courts and litigants have thought
about, or argued about, the rule; or
4. It changes what Professor Kimble has referred to as a ―sacred
phrase‖—―phrases that have become so familiar as to be fixed in
cement.‖247
The proposed amendment is clearly stylistic, not substantive, on
criteria one and two, because it would not change either the result or
procedure on an admissibility issue. It also seems stylistic on criterion four.
While the term ―not hearsay‖ to describe the impeachment (or other not
hearsay) use of an out-of-court statement is likely a sacred phrase,248 Rule
801(d)‘s oxymoronic use is an usurpation of that traditional phrase that
should be undone, not retained.
However, because it would change the ―structure of a rule and method
of analysis in a manner that fundamentally changes how courts and litigants
have thought about, or argued about, the rule,‖ a proposed amendment of
Rule 801(d) is substantive under criterion three. The purpose—indeed the
virtue—of the proposed amendment is to change, for the better, the way
that courts and litigants think and talk about admissions and prior
statements. Rather than having to think and talk in a convoluted way, all
participants will be able to converse clearly. Evidence would be not
hearsay if it is not offered for its truth; it would be hearsay but admissible
under an exception if it meets the exception‘s requirements, or hearsay with
no exception if it does not. Evidence law would take a welcome step
backwards, returning to a hearsay world with two questions (Is it hearsay?
If not, is there an applicable exception?) and three categories. This change
would be a simplification, a clarification, and a welcome improvement—
but is regarded as a substantive change under criterion three. Thus, the
amendment does not meet the restyling standards.
It is an open question whether an amendment to Rule 801(d) meets the
Advisory Committee‘s standards for general amendments. As noted, the
Advisory Committee outlined a conservative approach to amendments in its
1994 statement:

247. Id. at 3-4.
248. Id. at 4. The Advisory Committee determined that ―truth of the matter asserted‖ was
a sacred phrase and did not change it in the proposed restyling.
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Its philosophy has been that an amendment to a Rule should not
be undertaken absent a showing either that it is not working well
in practice or that it embodies a policy decision believed by the
Committee to be erroneous. Any amendment will create
uncertainties as to interpretation and sometimes unexpected
problems in practical application. The trial bar and bench are
familiar with the Rules as they presently exist and extensive
changes might affect trials adversely for some time to come.
Finally, amendments that seek to provide guidance for every
conceivable situation that may arise would entail complexities
that might make the rules difficult to apply in practice.249
This has been described as an ―if it ain‘t broke, don‘t fix it‖ approach
to amendment,250 and the Advisory Committee has clearly been cautious in
applying its cost-benefit calculus to proposed amendments. As the current
Reporter has written:
Amending or abrogating rules of evidence only makes sense
where the benefits of an amendment clearly outweigh the costs. .
. . If the courts are surviving with a rule as they appear to be,
however unhappily, the benefits of a rule change are unlikely to
outweigh the costs. This is not to speak of the costs of upsetting
settled expectations that come with any rule change.251
An amendment to Rule 801(d) clearly fails the first two factors
identified in the 1994 statement. It cannot be said that Rule 801(d) is ―not
working well in practice.‖252 Although the language of Rule 801(d) is
awkward, judges and lawyers have adapted well. Further, it likely does not
―embod[y]‖ a policy decision believed by the Committee to be
erroneous.‖253 Indeed, because the issue is classification, not admissibility,
the dispute over Rule 801(d) does not involve what one typically thinks of
as a policy decision. 254

249. Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules, 156 F.R.D. 339, 484 (1994).
250. Paul R. Rice, Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence: Tending to the
Past and Pretending for the Future? 53 HASTINGS L.J. 817, 823 (2002).
251. Daniel J. Capra, A Recipe for Confusion: Congress and the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 691, 702 (2001).
252. See Section IV, supra.
253. See Self Study of Federal Judicial Rule Making, supra note 242, at 484.
254. Under the general understanding of that term, ―policy decisions‖ involve questions of
admissibility, such as the scope of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context, the
standards for determining the expertise of an expert witness, or whether to apply Rule 407 to
products liability cases.
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On the other hand, and counting in its favor, this amendment is
unlikely to ―create uncertainties as to interpretation and sometimes
unexpected problems in practical application,‖ or to disorient the bench and
bar or adversely affect future trials.255 In fact, the amendment is likely to be
welcomed by the bench and bar, will improve clarity and communication,
and will lead to fewer uncertainties of interpretation and problems in
practice. Also counting as a positive is the fact that Rule 801(d) was not
included in the ―list of rules that the Advisory Committee has tentatively
decided not to amend . . . .‖ 256
In its initial consideration of the issue at its October 2010 meeting, the
Advisory Committee decided not to take any action. While the members
―agreed in principle with [my] proposal,‖ they felt that the rule ―was not a
source of ambiguity or confusion and was being applied properly in the
courts. Moreover, the members felt that the time and expense of making
and incorporating a rule amendment outweighed the need for changing the
rule at this time.‖257
In principle, then, there is agreement that admissions and prior
statements are better classified as hearsay exceptions than as ―not hearsay.‖
In this respect, it is clear that, if the Federal Rules of Evidence were being
drafted today (and especially if the drafters were using the Guidelines for
Drafting and Editing the Federal Rules), Rule 801(d)‘s ―not hearsay‖
language would not be used. However, the Advisory Committee does not
write on a clean slate; it must take into account the behavior and
expectations developed through thirty-five years of usage, even the usage of
an oxymoronic term. The Advisory Committee does not want to incur the
costs of disrupting learned behavior and settled expectations unless the
benefits exceed the costs.
The benefits of an amendment to Rule 801(d) are logic, clarity, and
consistency. There is a significant value in having a consistent meaning for
important terms like ―hearsay‖ and ―not hearsay.‖ It is helpful to have
frequently used types of evidence, like admissions and prior statements,
properly classified as hearsay exceptions. Hearsay is confusing enough

255. Self Study of Federal Judicial Rule Making, supra note 242.
256. Id. at 485. It is unlikely that Rule 801(d) and the ―not hearsay‖ language has any
supporters. While many writers have made harsh comments, see supra notes 12-14. I have found
only two people who have had anything good to say: Professor Thomas Green in 1970, supra note
100, and Dean Mason Ladd in 1973. Mason Ladd, Some Highlights of the New Federal Rules of
Evidence, 1 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 191, 197 (1973) (―Surely one of the highlights of the new
evidence rules is 801(d), entitled statements which are ‗not hearsay.‘‖).
257. Letter from Peter G. McCabe, Secretary to the Committee on Rules and Practice of
the Judicial Conference of the United States, to author (November 1, 2010).
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even without the addition of oxymoronic terms, and an amendment would
help everyone journey more safely and confidently through what has been
aptly described as ―the [hearsay] thicket.‖258
The costs of an amendment are, as described by the Reporter, the
―disruption of settled expectations, necessary adjustment, possible
inadvertent changes, etc,‖259 with arguably the most significant cost in this
instance being the disruption of electronic searches. The more extensive the
changes (new separate exceptions for both admissions and prior statements,
and the reassignment of Past Recollection Recorded to the prior statements
grouping), the greater the benefit in terms of clarity and education, but also
the greater the cost.260
As an example, consider the thoroughgoing alternative that lists all the
hearsay exceptions in a sequential fashion:
Rule 803 Exceptions – Prior Statements of a Witness
Rule 804 Exceptions – Statements of Party-Opponents
Rule 805 Exceptions – Availability of Declarant Immaterial
Rule 806 Exception – Declarant Unavailable
This structure is clear, orderly, and logical. If writing on a clean slate,
rules drafters would almost surely adopt such a sequential listing.
However, if imposed now as an amendment, such an approach would be
massively disruptive. While designed to address the Rule 801(d) problem,
it would renumber every hearsay exception. It would require lawyers and
judges to learn and use new numbers whenever referring to any hearsay
exception and, much more critically, would make electronic research much
more difficult. The costs of such an extensive change would exceed the
benefits.
In contrast, the preferred minimalist alternative would create new,
separate categories for admissions and prior statements without affecting
the other hearsay exceptions in any way. It retains Rules 803 and 804 and
then places prior statements and admissions in new Rules 808 and 809. It
would impose two costs—initial adjustment and relearning, and an impact
on electronic searches—both of which would be modest. Lawyers and
judges would have to learn that the rules for prior statements and

258. John M. Maguire, The Hearsay System: Around and Through the Thicket, 14 VAND.
L. REV. 741 (1960).
259. Capra memorandum, supra note 14, at 3.
260. See id. at 3 (―Generally speaking, the less drastic the approach, the less cost of
disruption, but also the less benefit provided.‖).
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admissions have moved, but that is not a difficult task.261 In electronic
searches, researchers will base their post-amendment searches for preamendment cases on the prior rule number without any difficulty, as cases
citing Rule 801(d) will still be accessible. There are no overlapping rules or
numbers to complicate the search or distort the search results. In the case of
the preferred minimalist alternative, then, the benefits of clarity and
consistency exceed the costs associated with the amendment.
VII. CONCLUSION
Rule 801(d)‘s ―non-hearsay‖ term is an oxymoron that contradicts the
traditional meaning of non-hearsay and misrepresents the hearsay nature of
admissions and prior statements. The rule should not have been enacted
originally and should be amended at the earliest opportunity.
The backstory of the rule is interesting in several different ways. It is
invigorating to be reminded of the nature and intensity of the debates over
the classifications that we now too readily take for granted. It is instructive
to learn again that the resolution of an issue at one time—as when the three
predecessor codes resolved the status of admissions and prior statements as
hearsay exceptions—is no guarantee that some future decision-maker will
reach the same result at a later date. And in light of the great achievement
that the Federal Rules of Evidence represent, it is disheartening to see, in
this one narrow area, both how poorly the Reporter performed in presenting
these classification issues to the Advisory Committee and how uncritically
the Advisory Committee, Congress, and the adopting states followed the
Reporter‘s lead.
An amendment will be difficult to achieve. The Advisory Committee
is commendably cautious and conservative in its approach to amending the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Stability in the law is a virtue. However, so are
adaptability and the ability to correct an original mistake. Perhaps as Rule
801(d)‘s backstory becomes better known, a growing discomfort with the
rule might begin to dissolve the comfortable familiarity that has developed
over the past thirty five years. And if that discomfort leads to thinking
about change, the profession generally and then the Advisory Committee
may come to the conclusion that the benefits of clarity and consistency
outweigh the modest costs associated with a change.

261. This adjustment would be similar to that experienced with the renumbering of the
residual exception with the Rule 807 amendment. Admissions and prior statements are used much
more frequently than the residual exception, but it is unclear whether this greater frequency would
make the adjustment more difficult or easier.

